Symmetry and Asymmetry in China-EU Partnerships （Zhou Hong）

I.  The China—EU Partnership in Retrospect

China established diplomatic relation with one of the important EU members, France, as early as 1964. After having regained its legitimate seat in the UN Security Council, China has restored diplomatic relations with Western European countries one after another, and started to exchange diplomatic envoys with the European Community in 1975, when cooperation between China and the EU has unfolded.

At the Member States level, China signed a Joint Communiqué with France on a Long-Term Comprehensive Partnership in 1997, and another one with Britain in the following year. China and Germany have worked as partners in many fields. When Chancellor Schröder visited China in December 2002, the present vice President of China, Mr. Hu Jintao voiced the desire to strengthen and further develop a comprehensive partnership with Germany and the European Union (EU).

At the EU level, China and the EU have established an Annual Summit Meeting mechanism starting from 1998, and reached a consensus on “Constructive Partnership”. The dialogue between Chinese and European leaders has covered issues that includes China and the WTO, human rights, exchange and cooperation in the financial sector, and in the fields of science and technology, energy, communication, education, administration, agriculture, environment, anti-terrorism, regional security, non-proliferation, etc. Before the Sixth China-EU Summit in 2003, the European Commission issued the fifth EU-China Policy Paper, and China correspondingly issued its first EU Policy Paper, which publicly promulgates China’s interests and goals in China-EU relations. The partnership between China and the EU is experiencing the best time ever.

This partnership runs synchronous with two developments: China’s Open-Door Policy with Economic Reform endeavor and the process of the European integration. In these history-making causes, partnership between China and Europe exercises far-reaching influence on the two developments respectively.

A better understanding of the driving force behind the partnership can be beneficial to the partnership itself. Mr. Robert Cooper, when describing the maxims for diplomacy, said that the essence of a foreign policy is “not only about interests”, but also about a country’s “perception of itself”, “about the kind of country it was and the kind of country it wanted to be.” To learn about “who we are” and “what kind of world we need?” “Who they are and what they would do?” And further, “what the commonalities and differences we share and have”, is an endeavor that has been elaborated by Chinese sages as an ultimate wisdom for success. To follow this wisdom, we shall try to identify the commonalities and differences, symmetries and asymmetries in China-EU relations in a changing world.

II.  Symmetry and Asymmetry in International Relations

The early Post-Cold-War period was the heyday of the West, permeated with the joy of total success over the East. Soon after, it was discovered that “stark simplicities and comforting symmetry”[1] was inexistent, and “a remarkably stable and predictable atmosphere”[2] also belonged to the past. On the other hand, the world became more insecure, unstable and unpredictable. The symmetrical structure on the surface in the international politics was disturbed, and various powers have gained all kinds of opportunities to develop and expand. During the Cold War, because of the symmetrical world political structure, the two Superpowers resembled each other amazingly, though underneath that symmetry, powerful asymmetrical powers persist, which at last put the symmetry to an end on the surface layer.

In 1974, Chinese American physicist Li Zhengdao was puzzled by an abrupt question made by Chairman Mao: “why symmetry is important?” To a politician, the evolution of human society is based on dynamics, not statics. To the physicist, “symmetry is by no means static. It is much more broadly defined than people usually believe, and can be applied to almost all the natural phenomena.”[3]

The relations between symmetry and asymmetry are also identifiable in international politics, complications and challenges, as well as dynamics and opportunities. Powers to destroy the old symmetry and to create new ones are everywhere to be found. Even during the Cold War, powers holding the world system were actually not equal: when the strong political mobilization power of the USSR declined, its less developed economic power could no longer sustain a symmetrical military machine vis-à-vis that of the US.

Similar asymmetries are everywhere to be found. The US is a world power, yet its policy-making that concerns the world is determined by “domestic politics” rather than “world politics”.[4] Germany and Japan are not military powers, but their powers are demonstrated in other areas such as trade and aid. Based on their overly asymmetric military power, the UK and the US have launched “pre-emptive” warfare, yet they have to face setbacks on hidden fronts. The Cold War had put to an end to a kind of symmetry; the new balance and symmetry have not been established. All kinds of powers of the world are seeking opportunities to develop themselves in different spheres, supported by different constituencies, and think in different ways, based on different historical experiences and legacies.

III.  Three Asymmetries in the Sino—European Relations

A classical anecdote of asymmetry in the Sino-European relations was the British envoy not willing to follow the Chinese protocol and kowtow to the Chinese emperor; the British later used gunboats to knock down the gate of the empire. This lesson prompted the Chinese to a self-strengthening and age-long resistance, until China regained political equality with the rest of the world a century later. The political equality, however, does not purport perfect symmetry in the Sino-European relations. In the economic, as well as the political and cultural arena, asymmetrical phenomena persist. Understanding such asymmetries and knowing their causes can serve as an important step toward the improvement of Sino-European partnership.

In sum, the asymmetries between China and Europe are identifiable in the following aspects:

• The different stages of economic development,
• The differences of political and social systems, and
• The different historical and cultural heritages.

1.    Asymmetrical Economic Development

European Union consists of a group of the world’s developed countries and contains “strong integrated powers.” “Its GDP and total value of trade account for 25% and 35% of the world total respectively.”[5] Per capita income in the EU and EU foreign investments are ranked high in the world. China on the other hand is the world largest developing country, and is laboring toward building a well-off society. China’s GDP and total trade counted only 5.1-5.4% and 4.7% of the world total, and per capita income in 2002 was less than $1000. China has an agricultural population of 60% of the total, and it is by no means comparable to that of the EU accounting for only 2%. In terms of infrastructure, investment environment, financial services and market capability, the gaps between China and the EU are enormous.

Asymmetry in economic development determines that China and the EU would select different industries as priorities for development and protection, and consequently choose different strategies and methods. In trade and investment, many European products command advantages. These differences can provide opportunities for cooperation, and can also intrigue interest disparity. In the Cancun Conference, this kind of disparity has caused non-cooperation between developed and developing nations. Europeans like Robert Cooper have realized that “from the point of view of less developed countries, European rules on agriculture must look very much like a unilateral imposition”.[6]

The economic asymmetries can also cause other frictions. The “social clauses” advocated by EU members in ASEM, for example, have not been received warmly by the developing countries, including China. These countries believe that they are already situated in comparative disadvantages in development; the only comparative advantage left to them is the relatively cheep labor cost.[7] Should they adopt the “labor standards” of Western countries, they will be deprived of opportunities to compete in the world market.

2.  Asymmetry in the Social and Political System

The EU and China have repeatedly stated that social systems and political doctrines have no impact on their bilateral cooperation. In fact, social and political differences are real, and their influences on China-EU relations are undeniable.   

In many EU policy papers on China, “concerns” about China’s political democratization and liberalization can be found and the attitudes are often commanding, sometimes even publicly condemning.[8] According to the EU, China has made great efforts and remarkable achievements in opening the society and reforming the economy; yet China does not belong to the democratic world, and the EU hopes to make contribution to China’s political democratization. From the symmetrical perspective, knowing that different civilizations will find different paths to democratization, China has not criticized EU politics and systems in the way as the EU does to China.

Other asymmetrical cases may be found in the decision-making structure of China and the EU, especially in the field of diplomatic decision-making. The asymmetry is caused by the uniqueness of the EU, which not only influences China-EU relations, but also poses challenges to, and far-reaching influences on, EU relations with other countries as well.

The EU is an extraordinary innovation of mankind. Its members have, by entering into international treaties, established super-national institutions, which acquired a role in the international arena. In the 1970s, the members of this Superpower (not the Super-state—Blair 2000) have reached consensus on their rights within the Union and the liberty to exit, and thus established a “flexible integration model” and an “open cooperation network”. The polity has thus become a completely unique one: it reached different integration degree in different issue areas, and national and super-national institutions have thus adopted different power-sharing relations. In the CFSP for example, the integration level is not comparable with that of the Economic and Monetary Union.

The EU decision-making process is complicated. Not only because there are already all kinds of common decision making procedures and social partnerships on the national level, but also because there are additional layers created on top of nation states, to which nation states are supposed to transfer some powers that they had acquired over centuries. This resulted in the emergence of many kinds of actors within the EU, including EU agencies, national governments and sub-governments, associations, businesses, regions and the academia. As far as the issues areas are concerned, Globalists and transnationalists started to argue in the early 1970s that the economic well-being had become as important as that of security.[9] They stressed that not only governments, but also societal actors, predominantly transnational corporations, were active in world politics. Regime theory noted that not only governmental, but also societal actors used organized cooperation in order to settle controversial issues.[10] Koehane and Nye argued that in addition to military power and governments, the world politics was predominated by intergovernmental and transnational actors, by economic interdependence and the pursuit of economic goals.[11] Beitz criticized the theory of neo-realism for insisting its view that only states act in favor of security and military predominance in the world.[12]

The multiple institutional structure of the EU does not fully explain its complexity. The European integration is continuing and its capacity and direction are still debatable. For outsiders, it is important to identify the driving forces for EU foreign policy, which create confusions for traditional sovereign states. Therefore, the questions such as “who makes European foreign policies”, “what is the nature of the European foreign policy process”, “what issues constitute the European foreign policy agenda”, “what instruments are deployed by European foreign policies”, “what is the context within which policy is made”, and “what are the outputs generated by the policy process” have to be answered.[13] The EU machine is complicated even for Europeans. Its multi-national, multi-leveled, changing and its sometimes-integrated- sometimes-separated actions have created new issues to the world, including China.

3. Cultural Asymmetry

Each nation has its own historical and cultural heritages and differences, which is quite natural. In comparison with China, European culture or cultures, have been identified, since the Renaissance, as self-recognizing and self-assertive, with a strong sense of superiority. During the last century, Europeans had been advocating their understandings and concepts around the world. China, on the other hand, had been learning from Europe since mid-1800s. Whether it was “Western doctrines moving slowly to the East”, or the “Western doctrines functioning for practical use, and Chinese doctrines functioning as substances”, the self-strengthening Chinese have more or less identified themselves with learning from the West, of which a main part is Europe. While judging each other from their own cultural backgrounds, Europeans tend to criticize China on issues like democracy and human rights, while Chinese have not habited to criticize Europe in the same way.

4.  Brief Summary

Because of the above-mentioned asymmetries, the Sino-European relations have gained a different nature compared to that of trans-Atlantic and EU-Russian relations. It is often said that foreigners cannot understand each other, and misperceptions originate from “judging others by one-self.” This is true to the US-EU relations and is more true to the Sino-EU relations, especially when the stronger power is able to maneuver with all kinds of strengths, be it hard or soft powers, such as persuasive words, forces, or economic pressure. If the stronger party does not recognize the comparative strengths and the comparative weaknesses existent in the relationship, the relationship can hardly be a sound and lasting one.

Due to the “converse preference” in the commodity market, information asymmetry emerges, which leads to the retrieval of high quality commodities from the market, and the dissolution of the market system. Can this “converse preference” happen in the international politics, causing miscalculation and the collapse of order? As information asymmetry and power asymmetry prevail, the issue of “converse preference” deserves attention, with the aim of a better partnership between China and Europe.   

IV.  Seeking for Symmetry and Reciprocity

China-EU partnership has experienced healthy development, thanks to the common efforts made by both parties in search of commonalities and reciprocities.

1.    Pursuing Strategic Consensus and Enlarging the Context

One of the important experiences in China-EU partnerships is to reach consensus on the strategic level. Leaders from both sides recognize each other’s importance in world affairs and decide that there are “no fundamental interest-conflicts” between China and the EU. Keeping their “national” or “community” identity to themselves, both China and the EU see their roles as responsive global players for peace and prosperity. With this consensus, the differences do not hinder the partnership, but offer opportunities for cooperation.

Similar historical experiences may also have attributed to this consensus. In the early literatures of the European integration, “size” had been “a key determinant for economic success.”[14] From this perspective, USA and the USSR were considered to represent the future, and China, rather than Japan, was regarded to have a better chance. The “size” conscience naturally served as a stimulus for the European integration in the same way as the drive for security, which corresponds with Jean Monnet’s idea of “enlarging the context” in dealing with seemingly unsolvable problems. The problem of two countries has been turned to one of six, nine, twelve, fifth and more. When more stakeholders are involved in the problem resolution, more comparative advantages and experiences are brought into play. The perspective of the “enlarging context” has also been practiced by Chinese modern diplomacy. In 1986, China joined PECC and took on commitments to “promoting economic cooperation and interaction, and collaborating on matters of common interest in economic, social, scientific, technological and management fields, and resource development, so as to make the Pacific Basin a prosperous, progressive and peaceful region.”[15] In 1990, China became a member of the APEC. In 1996, China initiated “the Shanghai Five” that developed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization five years later, and actively participated in regional organizations such as ASEM since it was established in 1996.  

The “enlarging context” perspective helps extend and deepen partnerships and also applies to China-EU relations. The constructive political and strategic dialogues between Chinese and European leaders have enabled communications between governments, sub-governments and non-government sectors in many bilateral fields, and in multilateral environment such as the ASEM and the UN. With more partners or actors involved in cooperation, the asymmetrical problems seem to blur. As machines for cooperation in various fields are up and running, difficulties caused by institutional and cultural asymmetry are swallowed by these machines and problems in the partnership have been reduced to the kind of technical ones.

2. Developing Market Rules and Work on Reciprocities

In the common cause between China and EU in pursuit of prosperity and development, EU commands advantages in capital and technology and China in manpower and market. These elements flow between China and the EU by market rules. Market rules with justice are thus an important mechanism for a sound partnership between unevenly developed partners, such as China and the EU.

Of course it is debatable as to what are the commonly accepted foundations for just and fair rules. Often at times, economic rules not only concern interests, but also security. To maintain prosperity can mean struggling to maintain similar systems or rules, an experience Europe had in creating the “Concert of Europe”.[16] In the post-Cold-War period, Europe has engaged itself in the new round of assimilation of members and neighbors economically, politically and socially, in order to secure the desirable life-style of the core Europe.

China has her own historical logic. Given China’s population, its development can influence the world market and the welfare of the EU. As a result, the world is concerned with the styles as well as the speed of China’s development. A strong, sustainable and balanced development of China’s economy can provide opportunities for European businesses and benefit European societies. On the other hand, a sound economic relationship between China and EU contains strategic importance for both sides. In other words, it shall benefit Europe and China simultaneously.

To cope with the asymmetrical problems in economics and trade, China needs first of all to strengthen the cooperation with EU, and improve its domestic market. The bilateral dialogue on the rules of industrial products has paved ways for this. In 2003, trade between China and the EU had exceeded 100 billion USD, 42 times of the volume in the year 1975. Since imports to China from Europe, the US and Japan are “replaceable”, a set of just and fair market rules is in favor of China.[17]

The economic asymmetry between China and EU determines their differences in interest. However, the two sides have successfully benefited each other by cooperating with each side’s comparative advantages. The partnerships have been developed in the fields of maritime transport, civil and space technology, peaceful use of nuclear power, industrial policies, social information, macro-economic analysis, public health, employment, education and training. The partnerships have been mutually beneficial.

3. Cultural Diversities and Cultural Tolerance

Both China and EU emphasize cultural diversities. This serves as a symmetrical base for the asymmetrical cultural cooperation between them. The acknowledgement of cultural diversities and tolerance has reduced the clashes of civilizations between the EU and China to a series of successful dialogues on human rights and democracy. EU has also cooperated with China on police and judge training, local election and other successful projects, which have fundamental influence on China’s development and China-EU partnerships. In 2003, China initiated the multilateral dialogue on “Cultures and Civilizations”, which is a conference participated by European and Asian young parliamentarians. Cultural cooperation can help to avoid political and economic conflict, by serving as a viscose between partners.

Moreover, both political partnership and economic cooperation are expected to lead to exchanges and intermingles of ideas, concepts, and habits, especially in the age of globalization. Better development opportunities, better living standards and environments, securer human conditions, these shared goals are “simply too vital to be risked for any short-term national consideration.”[18]

Furthermore, “the way in which decision-makers define their security interests is derived from their collective historical/social/cultural experiences and understanding.”[19] It is imaginable, that following the enrichment of experiences in partnership and greater understanding gained from the cooperation, following the tireless discussions on the “Asian model versus European model”, the cultural elements can have effects on the visions and wisdoms of decision-makers on both sides.[20]

IV.  “Win-Win” in Bilateral and Multilateral Environments

After World War II, European diplomacy experienced structural changes, whereas the “Concert of Europe” may be summarized as an emphasis on the equality among powers, their responsibilities, and their honor of commitments.[21] The 20^th century European diplomacy cannot simply be described as “great power politics”. The European diplomacy in this age contains two features, namely “Community (EC) foreign policy—the ‘economic’ dimension of European foreign policy”, the “Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)—the ‘political’ dimension of European foreign policy”, and the bilateral national foreign policies. Even within the bilateral relations of EU and China, the decision-making processes of European powers have been transformed by many factors, such as their “habits of cooperation”, the “advantages of shared information”, “responses to common threats” and “cost saving through increased collaboration.”[22]

The uniqueness of European foreign policy has brought new structures and contents into the partnership between the EU and China. The partnership in a broad sense includes China’s bilateral relations with EU members, multilateral political relations with the EU as a collective polity and bilateral economic relations with the EU as an integrated economic entity. Although this asymmetrical relationship may create cognitive confusion, it can also bring about new ideas and channels to the China-EU partnership.

Because of this asymmetry, the bilateral communiqués on partnerships such as “Sino-Franco Partnership” and “Sino-British Partnership” are slightly different. Whereas the China’s relationship with the EU puts emphasis on issues like arms control, UN reform, trade, education, technology, “the multi-polar world, national independence, and a just and reasonable world economic and political order”. China’s relationship with the EU Members concentrates on political, military and human rights dialogues, financial system reform, social security reform and poverty alleviation.

Based on the foregoing, China’s foreign policy to the EU should be based upon both holistic and country strategies. By developing bilateral partnerships with EU members, China can benefit from the comparative advantages of these member states. Besides, the EU member states have been supportive to an amiable EU-China relation. It was the EU member states that initiated EU policies that were favorable to China. In 1997, France, Germany, Spain and Greece withdrew from the condemnation of China’s human rights condition in Geneva. This initiative was followed by a Council announcement next year, which advocated having “dialogue” and “cooperation”, instead of “conflict” with China over these issues.

To cooperate with the EU as an economic entity, there are also numerous opportunities for the EU and China to have a “win-win” situation. In May 2002, when Wenzhou lighter industry had disputes with the EU Benchmarking Committee, which could not be settled within the framework of bilateral relations. The Chinese companies won the disputes by studying EU rules. Nevertheless, the efforts paid by Chinese enterprises in familiarizing with EU rules are helpful for China to maintain a good partnership with the EU.

Similarly, in the field of CFSP, the EU adopts an internal multilateral strategy to counterbalance the national interest among member states. If a member state, for instance, adopts a radical Taiwan policy, the policy will have to go through multilateral processes to become the EU policy, and will normally fail to become one. Therefore, it is beneficial for China to study the asymmetrical decision-making processes of the EU and to understand its driving forces, in order to achieve a rationalized and healthy partnership with the EU.

When China and the EU are situated in a multilateral environment, their partnerships will again be influenced by the structural asymmetry. For example, in the UN Security Council, or in the ASEM, the positions of EU member states have to be influenced by at least an additional layer on top of their traditional national interests. In this case, opportunities for partnerships can be found. Europeans rely on international law for their multilateralism to work,[23] and this can greatly push China-EU cooperation towards the cause of world peace. Today, the world powers are asymmetrical, and various transportation and communication instruments thaw the traditional national borders. In addition to states, which are the main actors of the international society, state unions, especially the EU, are playing an ever-growing role. However, the EU has limits in its competences, e.g. it lacks hard forces to enforce its will in the same way as US tends to do, but may act by employing soft powers in the framework of international law. The power of this nature makes EU a better partner for a peace-loving China. China and EU can advocate multilateralism, international rules, law, and balanced development in an involving world, and win time and space for development at home.

V.  Conclusions

In the traditional French System of diplomacy, the international relations are state-centered, and conducted by official envoys. The only measurements of such diplomacy are by the degree of protection and expansion of national interests. Even in the post-cold-war period, most countries continue to view their national welfare as the top priority of their foreign policy.

As the European integration made changes on the national interests and identities of Europe, the contents and methods of the European foreign policy, or foreign policies, have changed accordingly. These changes have input both bilateral and multilateral contents into the China-EU partnerships. China, as well as the rest of the world, is having a hard time in figuring out “how many Europes there are,”[24] and how many elements should be taken into consideration when cooperating with the EU. Questions like these tend to determine the long-lasting nature of asymmetry in the China-EU partnership.

For the EU, its multi-level structure has provided it with a capacity not possessed by any traditional sovereign states: within this structure, EU foreign policy has acquired many driving forces and initiatives, and is able to reach to the broadness and depth others might not. To cooperate with a multi-layered partner, China has to learn to work with rules and to mobilize actors on many levels. This will in turn speed up the reform, increase the openness of China, and open up more opportunities for the Chinese people and the civil society.

It should be noted that China’s relations with EU institutions are not to replace its bilateral relations with EU members. China’s bilateral relationship with EU member states, when put under the framework of a China-EU relationship, can not only push forward the comparative advantages of both China and the member states of the EU, but also enhance the multiplicity and colorfulness of the China-EU partnership.

In order to better understand the potentiality and limits of the China-EU partnership, the research group has devoted itself to in-depth researches on the economic and trade relationship between China and Europe, the concepts and cultures behind the relationships, as well as relevant politics and security issues. They have also attempted to evaluate China’s partnerships with the main EU member states and the China-EU partnership in the multilateral environment such as in the ASEM and the UN organizations.