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LIU Zoukui

liuzk@cass.org.cn

Assistant Researcher

Institute of European Studies

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences • Beijing 100732

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Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Jianneidajie 5, Beijing, 100732
CHINA

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Liu Zuokui

Abstract: This article expounds the transformation of the Turkish Kurdish Worker Party (PKK) Diaspora from the violent group to the social movement organization under the influence of the EU's institutional structure. The author argues that the EU's special institutional structure and governance model are the cause of the PKK's transformation. Turkey's appeal to the accession to the EU encouraged the PKK to exert pressures on Turkish government about the minority's equality-so called Kurdish legal rights. Analyzing the Europeanization of the PKK, the author tries to show some enlightenment to China. ^①

Key Words: Kurdish Worker Party Europeanization Social Movement
European Union Institutional Structure

There appears new tendency in recent years of problems of minorities and religions in the world due to the integration of global economy and politics. The main characteristics is that the group who was in seek of independence by violence, exiled to Europe (they are often called Diaspora) and conducted some transformations, then challenged to the homeland as a challenger community.

But why have changes taken place after the Diaspora moved into the European countries and played a very important impact on their homeland as a challenger? In this article, the author tries to conduct a case study of the Turkish Kurdish Worker Party (PKK) Diaspora to find the root cause. When the Diaspora merged into the European countries, they changed from a violent group to an influential pressure group outside the EU and its members. By virtue of the lobbying on EU's institutions and individuals, they pushed the EU to criticize the deterioration of democratic values in Turkey and accepted Kurdish Diaspora who demanded the cultural and political equality in their homeland but was marginalized or ignored. In the end, the Turkey had to change its discriminative policy to the Kurdish minority before it managed to get accession to the EU.

The Kurdish Worker Party Diaspora in Europe

The Kurdish Worker Party once was a party in Turkey in 1970s. The Turkish government at that time suppressed the Kurd's struggle for their self-determination in Turkey by armed force. The PKK who led the movement of fighting against government, started to resist the government violently in May 1983, and led to the antimony between Kurdish minority and Turkish government. After the overwhelmingly sweeping over the guerrilla of the PKK, some members of the PKK fled to Europe, Canada and US. In some European countries, especially in Germany, the PKK continued to fight for the self-determination of Kurdish minority in Turkey. In this article, the author will mainly take Germany as a case study.

There lived a great deal of Kurds who formed a steady community organization in Germany in the 1990s. After the second world war, the devastated Germany was in urgent need of labors to conduct the reconstruction of the country. But the young German lost their lives on the battle ground, and the Federal

Republic of Germany started to recruit labors from Turkey. Since then, thousands of Turkish people stormed into German territory. According to the statistics, in 1979 there were 1.2 million Turks living in Germany and the number increased to 1.5 million in 1981^②. At the same time, the Kurds accounted for 20 percent of all the Turks, according to the specialist on Kurdish people--Gerard Chaliand.^③The Kurdish wanted to continue their battles against the Turkish government. The PKK solidified the Diaspora and immigration of Kurds in Germany and became the leader of the Kurdish movement to fight against Turkish government.^④

On 17 February, 1999, due to the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's being captured in Kenya^⑤, hundreds of Kurdish protestors ran into the Israeli consulate general in Berlin. These armed Kurds intended to take hostage several of the Israeli consulate employees to show their hate of the Kenya government, who sold the Ocalan, the leader of fighting for Kurdish minority, to the Turkish government. German police worked to disperse the crowds and arrested more than 1000 Kurdish protestors. For days, similar scenes of violence was played in cities with significant Kurdish immigrant communities in Western Europe. Kurdish protestors attacked Greek and Kenyan embassies and consulates in Germany, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Italy. The sudden eruption of violence surprised the German public and European society.

From the activities which the PKK had conducted in Germany, we can find that, it was still a violent group who tried to use armed conflicts to surprise the public in Europe and get what they wanted or show their dissatisfaction with the Turkish government. The activities of the organization didn't change compared with what it had done in Turkey in 1980s.

The Strategic Change of the PKK in European Countries

It is worth noting that, the Ocalan's being captured in 1999 was a turning point in the PKK's struggle for national self-determination for the Kurdish minority. While Western European governments and Turkish government hoped to marginalize and eventually eliminate PKK structures, the Kurdish organization

underwent a tactical and organizational transformation from the violent group to the social movement organization. On 12 January, 2000, the PKK's Central Committee released a statement indicating an initial policy shift in favor of civilian activism instead of a continued war of liberation. After its Seventh Extraordinary Party Congress, the organization publicized further details about the PKK's policy shift. In article 5, the PKK announced that it emphasized "an effective and continuous campaign" to pursue two primary goals, namely freedom for Ocalan, and a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish struggle.^⑥ In article 8, the PKK expressed its goal to represent itself as a viable and legitimate political organization in the international community, which would require the establishment of political offices across Europe to pursue an effective pressure campaign against Turkey.^⑦ On some other occasions, the PKK tried to show the following political will: (1) give up the armed manners to solve the Kurdish discrimination, and take peaceful manners to realize its political requirement, for example, mass demonstrations, stay-down strike, adjuration, negotiation and so on; (2) abandon the requirement of Kurdish self-determination, and call for Turkish government's reform to improve the Kurdish status.

However, why the PKK in European countries, especially in German experienced such strategic transformation?

Firstly, at the EU's members level, Germany played the biggest impact on its transformation. Its respect and enforcement of the law and regulation forced the PKK to abandon the forcible manners. Chinese Scholar Bian Qian argues that, the German people fully respect the rules and contracts, and always believe in rules instead of the God.^⑧ So Germany is often called 'regulatory state'.

In 1990s, the PKK made many chaos in Europe, the German government declared officially that the PKK was an illegal organization, and prohibited its activities. In its welfare system, the government absolutely didn't permit any organization to conduct violent activities and damage the stability of the society. German Chancellor Schroeder commented that 'those (Kurds) who live in Germany are welcome if they adhere to law and order. Those who violate the law must leave the country. We cannot tolerate conflicts being played out on

German streets which are not even our conflicts.’[®] On 17 February 1999, German Interior Minister Schily warned that foreign criminals would be expelled and that Kurds had to cease illegal actions, because ‘the government will not allow Germany to become a playing field for political conflicts that do not belong on German soil.’[®] The PKK in Germany had no choice but to give up its violent activities.

Secondly, the policy transformation of the PKK was influenced by institutional background of the whole European level as well. The Europeans have strong repellency to the violent movement and have good abilities to institutionalize the peaceful social movement. The organizer of the social movement in Europe at the initial stage would adopt the violent manners to get their targets, however, as the situations changed, these organizations took on the peaceful characteristics increasingly. It is the most striking change in European society since the second world war. The reasons are as follows: first, people hate the war and enjoy the thoughts of pacificism; second, some European countries experienced turbulences and now tend to stability-the systems of government and parliament are consummating and people are more willing to resort their requirements to the government by peaceful manners; third, Europeans found out from many experiences that, after the institutionalization of social movements, the number of these movements increased remarkably, but the damage to the society decreased rapidly.¹¹ So the national governments preferred the institutions, rules and law which were fit for the peaceful social movement. In other words, EU’s institutions showed strong reconstructive ability to violent groups-such as the PKK. Under this conditions, in public demonstrations and protest marches in Germany, the PKK’s rhetoric emphasized such values as Kurdish identity, commitment to the Kurdish cause .

Thirdly, the systems of the EU provide an opportunity to accomplish the PKK’s objects-lobby but not violence. It can take less stakes to get more benefits.

All EU member states participate in lobbying activities as numerous interest organizations do to get their special objects in EU systems. The most influential groups work on behalf of business, labor, agriculture and environmental interests. EU expert John McCormick asserted that “by the early 1990s, the

Commission estimated that there were about 3000 interest groups based in Brussels trying to influence EU affairs.”¹²In fact, the Kurdish Diaspora learned that its political agenda would be heard and considered only if it participated within the existing EU systems and got accustomed to the game rule of the EU. The PKK leaders gradually realized that the lobby would be a good “charm offensive” to gain access to parliamentarians in the EU. So they tried to play as the pressure group or interests group do to integrate deeply into the game play. By utilizing relationships with insiders such as members of the European Parliament and European national governments, the Kurdish question acquired a prominent place in EU-Turkish negotiations which we will discuss in the following part.

How the PKK Got Their Objects in EU Systems

The Kurdish Diaspora in European countries provided the most effective strategy for the PKK to gain recognition as a equal national minority in Turkey. It is a political goal and an economic necessity for Turkey to eventually join the European Union. This provided the Kurdish Diaspora with a powerful political leverage point, which enabled the movement to pressure Turkey into granting national minority rights to Kurds in a step-by-step process.

In Europe, especially in Germany, the PKK used all kinds of manners to get the awareness of more European organizations and individuals. For example, they use the paper, magazines, radios, TV and internet to call on international community to pay attention to Kurdish affairs. Besides, the PKK pursued every opportunity to condemn the Turkish government-Kurdish-language satellite television, web-based television, radio programming, newspaper, magazine and so on. They increased the production of propaganda pamphlets, the distribution of information via the internet, and recruited Kurdish-German youth and women into regional clubs. The protestors displayed enlarged photos and disturbing video images of Turkish soldiers posing next to a group of decapitated PKK fighters. Graphic posters depicting victims of the Turkish war on Kurds flooded European cities. During nocturnal campaigns, groups of teenagers plastered hundreds of such posters along streetcar routs, in railway stations and somewhere else. ¹³The organization also tried to reach out to

human rights and environmental organizations, and attempted to broaden the appeal of the PKK and its political goals to wider and, ultimately, more sympathetic audience. Increasingly, the movement is gaining strength in numbers of supporters through improved connections with European organizations.

What should be emphasized is that, when realizing the Kurdish cause could gain support from human rights and environmental organizations, the PKK furthered contacts and exchanges with these organizations. Since the representatives of these organizations regularly attended EU meetings and provided reports to officials in various committees, these representatives would help to introduce Kurdish cultural and political concerns in the EU. With the assistance of the environment and human rights communities, the Diaspora pushed the EU to take an interest in the Kurdish conflicts, and demanded that European human rights norms should be enforced in Turkey. This tactic succeeded with the shift in the international climate in favor of including human rights issues into EU negotiations as a consequence of the electoral successes of social-democratic and environmental parties in the 1990s. Taking advantage of the international attentions to the Kurdish affairs, Diaspora leaders hoped to influence the relationship between EU and Turkey.

Surely, the Kurdish peaceful movement increased the general awareness of Kurdish demands in Europe. By late 1990s, sustained protests contributed to the advancement of the Kurdish question as an issue of concern for the EU. The Turkish government experienced growing resistance to its unchanging internal political conditions during accession negotiations, even though it had applied for EU membership in 1987. While the country's eligibility to join the EU remained intact and has been confirmed by the 1995 Custom Union Agreement, problems related to the treatment of the Kurdish minority in Turkey called for the EU's attention. Members of the European Parliament expressed concern regarding the undemocratically dealing with the Kurdish minority. The EU slowed down the negotiation process with the Turkey.

Among the left-leaning German representatives of the European Parliament, a small group regularly challenged Turkish human rights and minorities policies.

It is not surprising that those who most clearly articulated their positions in regard to Turkey's lack of progress in areas of democratization and human rights belong to the Party of the European Socialists, the Confederal Group of the European United Left and the United Greens. Several of the most critical members of the European Parliament were Turkish-German, Kurdish-German and Greek-German ethnic backgrounds. An outspoken critic of Turkish policies toward the Kurdish minority is Feleknas Uca¹⁴, an ethnic Kurdish German woman and the member of the German Party of Democratic Socialism. Two other critics were Greek-origin German Social Democratic Party delegate Jannis Sakellariou¹⁵ and Turkish-origin German Ozan Ceyhun¹⁶, a former member of the German Green Party. There are also another sympathies from the European Green Parties, for example, Darren Johnson¹⁷, Mischa Borris¹⁸, Jean Lambert¹⁹ and someone else. In the end, these suggestions became the policy agenda of the EU and led to the Europeanization of the Kurds.

But why the PKK could take good advantage of organizations, for example, of human rights and green politics and win the opportunity to cooperate with them? These organizations always pursue the "world value"—so called democracy, human rights, rule and law, and rights of minorities and so on. The PKK had much trouble to find the proper cooperators at first, however, with the rise of the Green Parties, who often use the human rights to broaden their prestige, the PKK found the opportunity to make their voice heard. As to the Green Parties, their members in the EU exerted the pressure on the EU in terms of the Turkish Kurdish problems when the Turkey was applying for the EU membership, and forced the EU to adjust its accession policy to Turkey. Then they can receive the support rate from Diaspora in Germany or in European countries. In the end, they got a lot of votes from the Kurdish problems, and went into the European parliament and became the member. This is a game of mutual benefits.

Comments on the Transformation of the PKK and its Enlightenment to China

In recent years, some Diaspora who were influenced by EU institutions conducted some policy transformations. The homeland facing these changes shouldered more and more pressures. EU's institutional structures offered more

opportunity to these Diaspora. This openness on some occasions interfered the internal affairs of some countries which have the problems of minorities and religions. It is no doubt that the problem of the Kurdish minority is the internal affair of the Turkey and no countries have the right to rebuke this.

More and more politicians noticed that, the transformations of many Diaspora had some fraudulences. In order to get more rights, even the independence, some Diaspora openly stated that they would give up the independence and only wanted to get more rights of self-determinations, which would get more sympathies and could create more space to maneuver their independent intentions. However, to some extent, EU didn't know the truth well and could not stand in the view of countries which were disturbed by the Diaspora. EU often thinks that some countries adopt discriminative policy to the minorities and should be blamed and punished, irrespective of facts of these countries' political reality and concrete policies of minorities and religions. In sum, to the Diaspora, EU is always pursuing the 'world value' but deficient of reflection systems which can tell the true from the false.

There are all kinds of minorities and religions as well and facing a lot of relevant problems in China today. As a rising power, China is enjoying more and more attentions from the western countries, especially the EU and US. The cooperations and disputes between them would be increasing. The questions of minorities and religions are often treated as a prerequisite and pressure, and are usually exerted to China by the western countries in order to get more concessions from the bargaining with China. In recent years, followed by the increasing disputes of trade and value between the EU/US and China, we should pay more attention that the EU/US exert pressures on us by the question of Chinese minorities and religions. It is time that we would learn the EU's internal operational mechanism well. Just based on the above analysis and case study, the author tries to send such enlightenment to the Chinese government.

Firstly, learning the EU's operational mechanism and its development tendency, and making sure of the formation mechanism of Europeanization, especially its unique political structure and governance model. Just as we have mentioned before, the PKK properly dealt with the relationship between EU-national

governments-interests groups or pressure groups, and successfully spoke out its voice and forced the Turkish government to make a choice to its minority policy. This new phenomenon should be noticed.

Whether EU's institutions are good or not, China should regard it as a reality which will not change as Chinese wish. We should get accustomed to EU's special governance manners from the governmental to organizational levels. At different levels, we should communicate with and propagandize to them, wipe out the worries of EU, let EU accept the development and progress of China, and find out the truth of facts. So governmental diplomacy alone could not solve this problem. China should encourage different actors to participate the communication with EU in different manners and discourses. We should adopt different ways if we want to defend our national interests.

Secondly, establishing anti-game early-warning systems. In the circumstance of globalization, cooperative games have become the mainstream. Based on the bilateral and multilateral dialogues and cooperations, China should avoid the pressures from the EU by virtue of minorities and religions. We should advise EU that, only through further cooperations, we can get mutual benefits. But the EU is always considering China as the 'non-democratic jumbo', and often takes the problems of full market economy, intellectual property rights, human rights, environment and religions to bring pressures to China so that it can get concessions from China. The PKK could not make a comparison with China's Dalai Lama issue, but we should have full awareness of many similarities between them. We should make good preparations and establish the anti-game early-warning systems to learn the operations of EU's institutions, and further and broaden the cooperations and dialogues with the EU.

Thirdly, attaching much importance to the "lobbyism"(in Chinese means gongguanhua, "公关化") transformation of the foreign policy in the international communities. In history, the human once achieved their aims through the war, negotiation, bargaining. As the EU came out, there occurred to the new phenomenon--so called the 'lobbyism' of the foreign policy. From the EU's governance structure, European Council is the decision-making organ, but its decision-making opportunities are shared by political representatives of

different member states and permanent representatives consisting of the officers and specialists from different European countries. One of the characteristics of the EU's governance is drawing broadly on the opinions of civil societies or interests groups, then adopt to the 'open method coordination'(OMC). So this governance provides more opportunities for lobbying, canvassing and public activities from interests groups and individuals, including the Diaspora. We should attach much importance, investigate and deal well with this governance.

^① Thank you very much for the information given by Vera Eccarius-Kelly, whose docoter dissertation "From Terrorism to Political Activism in Europe: The Transformation of the Kurdish Diaspora to A Transnational Challenger Community" gave me so much enlightenment. I will thank for the Italian Istituto Affari Internazionali Nathalie Tocci's warmly offering to me some articles about this topics, and also I will thank for the Chairperson of the Bulgarian Economic Policy Institute Ivanka Petkova's instruction.

^② Vera Eccarius-Kelly, *From Terrorism to Political Activism in Europe: The Transformation of the Kurdish Diaspora to A Transnational Challenger Community*, Doctoral Dissertation presented to Tufts University in Boston, 2002, p. 59.

^③ Gerard Chaliand, ed., *A People without A Country: The Politics of Kurdistan*, NY: Olive Branch Press, 1993, p.13.

^④ David Horrocks and Eva Kdinsky, ed, *Turkish Culture in German Society Today*, Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1996, p.114.

^⑤ About the details of this matter, please log on the following websites:

<http://www.abdullah-ocalan.org/2008/capture-of-abdullah-ocalan-the-future-of-counter-terrorism/> and <http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Abdullah-Ocalan>

^⑥ Twelve Articles from PKK Congress, *Kurdish Observer*, 15, February 2000.

^⑦ Twelve Articles from PKK Congress, *Kurdish Observer*, 15, February 2000.

^⑧ Bian Qian, *German Culture in the Twentieth Century*, The Oriental Publishing House, 1999, forward, page.5.

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