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## The World Implications of the “Chinese Road” in the Context of Globalization

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中国建国60年来和改革开放30年来所取得的巨大成就，使世界热衷于讨论是否存在某种“中国模式”或“北京共识”。“模式”包含着两层含义，一是发展道路的独特性，二是发展道路的可输出性和可效仿性。从前一层含义上来看，中国的发展的确创造出了一个独特的中国模式。中国发展道路是在中国人追求民族独立和现代化的历史背景下，在最终选择了马克思主义的条件下而实现的，其本质就是选择走社会主义道路而拒绝资本的扩张和奴役。全球化伴随着全球资本力量的无限膨胀，世界政治、经济都沦于世界资本主义的奴役之下，中国的发展道路正是在这个背景下显示出其独特性。同时，中国也不会向外输出自己的发展模式，通过对和谐、平等和多样性的追求，中国道路的成功将改变现有国际规则和全球发展观念。中国道路在全球化时代中具有世界性的意义。

关键词：全球化 中国模式 北京共识 中国道路 国际规则

China's immense achievements over the sixty years since the founding of New China, especially in the last thirty years since the institution of reform and opening up, have inspired heated debate on whether there exists a “Chinese model of development” or a “Beijing consensus.” The term “model” has two layers of meaning: one refers to the uniqueness of China's development road, the other to its exportability and imitability. In terms of the former, China has indeed created a unique developmental model. China's development path was arrived at when the Chinese people finally chose Marxism in the course of their pursuit of national independence and modernization. Its essential character is the choice to follow the socialist road and reject capitalist expansion and enslavement. Globalization follows the unbounded aggrandizement of capital, which brings world politics and economy under the domination of world capitalism. It is against such a background that the uniqueness of the Chinese road of development stands out. At the same time China has no intention of exporting its own model of development. Rather, China's pursuit of harmony, equality and diversity among nations will allow the success of the Chinese road to change current

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international rules and concepts of global development. In this era of globalization, the Chinese road is of world significance.

**Keywords:** globalization, the Chinese model, the Beijing consensus, the Chinese road, international rules

Very soon New China will celebrate its sixtieth birthday. The number sixty means a full cycle of years in the traditional Chinese chronology, signifying the whole process of development of everything under heaven from conception to maturity as well as the beginning of a completely new stage.

During these memorable years great and radical changes have taken place and New China, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), has grown from a weak and fragmented country subject to internal strife and external humiliation into burgeoning prosperity. In its first thirty years, New China took its first arduous steps toward industrialization and maintained a six percent annual growth rate; in the second thirty years, it attained an average annual growth rate in double digits, an achievement whose speed left many developed countries gasping. Although development is not balanced, per capita wealth and resources are still extremely limited and China's future development has a long way to go, its decisive economic scale and its political stand of peace, development and cooperation have drawn widespread attention from both developing and developed countries. Just as some developing countries are beginning to "look east," trying to find laws in China's distinctive experience of development that can assist their own development, discussions of the "Chinese model," the "Beijing consensus" and even the "Chinese threat" have been coming thick and fast. Another view holds that as China develops economically, it will follow Western laws of development and move on to the path of political democratization.<sup>1</sup>

A minority of people in both China and the West still adhere to the belief that China's successful development is simply a classic example within the realm of universal laws; sooner or later, China will follow the road of modernization traversed by the developed West. However, the uniqueness of China's development has already been demonstrated by the history of China since the Opium Wars as well as by the course of reform over recent thirty years; that is, the distinctive and unique proposition of "building a socialism with Chinese characteristics" and the simple and unadorned expression of "following our own road"<sup>2</sup> put forward by Deng Xiaoping at the Twelfth National Congress of the CPC after he summed up

1 With regard to "the Chinese model" and "the Beijing consensus," see J. C. Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus*; "Retrospect on studies of the Chinese model: from 'the Beijing consensus' to 'the Chinese miracle'"; and discussions on "the Chinese road" in *Chinese Social Sciences Today*, July 1, 2009. Concerning "the theory of Chinese threat," see Cheng Yung-nien, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity and International Relations*.

2 Deng Xiaoping, "Opening Speech at the Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China," p. 2.





China's long years of historical experience.<sup>3</sup>

Pursuing a developmental road suited to its own national conditions in the light of national or regional features is not only China's experience, but also the practice of other countries and regions. A lot of countries and regions use the term "model" to show the uniqueness of their own developmental path, with the result that the "East Asian model," "Latin American model" and "EU model" have appeared in the vocabulary of international affairs; among EU members, we even see the "German model," "British model," "Swedish model," etc., because, "in spite of the fact that to outward appearance, all the nation-states in Europe belong to one model, they are widely divergent from one another...this model seems to be universal, but in fact each state has its own distinguishing features."<sup>4</sup> The first use of the word "model" is therefore to define distinctiveness: the EU model is different from the American model or the East Asian model because it has its own independent "mode" of operation, and its experience and development should not be confused with those of the American or the East Asian model. A second layer of meaning of the term "model" is to treat a certain particular "mode" as an "example" to be popularized or emulated in other countries or regions.

Many Europeans use the word "model" in their discussions largely because they believe, based on their own social practice, that "Europe as an integrated whole" offers a model that differs from that of other sovereign states, and especially from the American model with its veneration and promotion of the global market. For instance, they analyze the European Economic and Monetary Union, the US, Japan and Britain as different economic models in order to show how the holistic features of the European Economic and Monetary Union differ from other Western economies<sup>5</sup> and put the "European social model" under the spotlight<sup>6</sup> in order to negate the metaphysical, simplistic and standardized interpretation so far offered for successful social models. They judge the EU, as an institution which is neither a state nor a super-state, to be *sui generis* in order to highlight its distinctiveness, and so on. Recently, when Central European scholars used the term "European model" in their study of the EU, they specifically noted in the introduction: "When we use the term 'model' we do not presuppose that the EU is a political system which has achieved the optimal solution for securing peace, freedom and the welfare of its citizens nor do we expect that it has developed institutions and procedures that could be applied to any other system irrespective of context factors."<sup>7</sup> Their aim was to delve deeply into the distinctive characteristics of the EU as a force and as a system.

3 Deng Xiaoping, "We Must Follow Our Own Road in Economic Development as We Did in Revolution," p. 100.

4 Gil Delannoi, *Sociologie de la Nation*, p.72.

5 A. Bagnai and F. Carlucci, "An Aggregate Model for the European Union," pp. 623-649.

6 These debates show that even within the EU there are further classifications of the "North European model," the "Anglo-Saxon model," the "Continental model," the "Mediterranean model," etc., distinctions that will not disappear in the near future. See *EU Debates European Social Model*.

7 Beate Kohler-Koch and Zhou Hong, "Discussions on the 'European Model'," pp. 1-2.



Daniel Large, a specialist on China-Africa relations, holds that the Chinese road of development is unique and that the success of this unique model has attracted much attention worldwide, especially in the third world, and become an idea different from any other ready-made experience of the post-colonial period and a new source of development aid.<sup>8</sup> Meanwhile, Stephen Marks believes that the most prominent feature of the Chinese model is that “China did not develop by following the rules of the Washington consensus” and that China “avoided good governance and human rights conditionality now commonly insisted on by the West.” The idea underlying this model differs from ideologies centered on the Western experience and “China’s experience does indeed have much to offer that is of greater relevance precisely because China too is a developing country;”<sup>9</sup> it thus shakes the universal values of the Western experience and the strategic and practical interests safeguarded by these values as well as the international rules of the game dominated so far by the West.

The second use of the term “model” is often connected with an export strategy. The policy proposals put forward by the “Washington consensus” for Latin America, such as privatization and financial and trade liberalization, represent the holistic interests of Western capital; together with the economic liberalization, marketization and privatization proposed by “shock therapy,” they are designed to establish the pre-eminence of markets over governments and then, through command of market rules, to gain control over the whole world. Exports of the democratic model and the human rights model are often vehicles of this aim. Former Chancellor of West Germany, Helmut Schmidt, once frankly pointed out that the US tried to use the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a tactic of suppression in pursuing its foreign policy and that when the US imposed economic sanctions on dozens of countries, their essence was not human rights but preservation of America’s world hegemony.<sup>10</sup> America’s purpose in spending vast amounts of money to export its democratic system and ideas to developing countries and making this a basic foreign policy was also to eliminate the threat from so-called “non-democratic states.”

The “Chinese model” under discussion is expressed mainly in the first use of “model” outlined above. After more than a hundred years of concerted efforts at rejuvenation and sixty years of construction and innovation, China has stepped on to a path of relatively steady development and developed distinctive modes of preserving peace, promoting harmony and guaranteeing development. If these can be regarded as the Chinese “model,” then this model was certainly not accomplished overnight, but rather came into being gradually amid difficulties and hardships, bloodshed and sacrifice, and repeated refinements. In retrospect, this has been a process of unswerving perseverance in spite of privations and setbacks.

8 Daniel Large, “Beyond ‘Dragon in the Bush’: The Study of China-Africa Relations,” p. 53.

9 Stephen Marks, “Introduction,” pp. 6-7.

10 Helmut Schmidt, *Auf der Suche nach einer öffentlichen Moral and Globalisierung*, pp. 254-255.



## I. Origin of the Chinese Road of Development

Many Europeans showed very early on that the uniqueness of each nation-state's developmental road stems from a very long historical process, being "an accumulation of practice, a heritage of political operation tested in a quite different background."<sup>11</sup> The civilization of many peoples was developed independently by their ancestors over the course of aeons of history on the basis of self-evolution. For example, on the basis of his profound knowledge of the history of Chinese science and technology, Joseph Needham came to the conclusion that the Chinese inventions were original creations and that at some periods the flow of civilization had been from East to West, not from West to East.<sup>12</sup>

In spite of the fact that rigorous scientific research has long established the principle that civilizations develop independently and that influences between different civilizations are a two-way rather than a one-way street, people trumpeting "Eurocentrism" or "Occidentalism" have always believed that the civilization that originated in Europe was not just dynamic, but also represented the sole successful and correct logic of development. They not only believe that models of civilization are transmissible but even condescendingly think that they alone hold the key to modernization. Some even think that compared with the Europeans, who developed modern civilization long ago, the Asians and Africans are barbarous peoples who live on the remote periphery of civilization and need to be civilized through the expansion of civilization from the "center" to the "periphery" via conquest, colonization and education. Many insightful people in the West are against such views. Former Chancellor Schmidt admitted that even though the industrialized West had become conscious of its responsibilities since the end of the Second World War, they had exercised these responsibilities in a paternalistic way.<sup>13</sup> The latest EU China Policy Paper is full of such expressions as "the EU should help China carry out ... reform;" in sharp contrast, China's EU Policy Paper stresses "equality and mutual benefit" throughout and does not carry on about reforms the EU should undertake.

Those who think the European (or Western) model of modernization can be copied lock, stock and barrel forget two most fundamental facts: one, the true history of the development of European civilization contains not only things such as science, rationality, freedom and democracy that were refined, abstracted and brought together by the Europeans themselves, but also things considered shameful that have been opposed and covered up, such as social Darwinism and fascism. The development of European industrial civilization has been accompanied by the cruelty of "sheep eating men" in the enclosure movement, the helplessness of workers turned into machines, unbridled colonial plunder and innumerable tragic wars. If the Western model is imitable, it is not possible just to copy what was

11 Gil Delannoi, *Sociologie de la Nation*, p.72.

12 Pamela Kyle Crossley, *What is Global History?* p. 30.

13 Helmut Schmidt, *Auf der Suche nach einer öffentlichen Moral und Globalisierung*, p. 237.





positive to the exclusion of what was opposed and covered up. Two, the Western model of development, the so-called only successful model of development in history, was based on the underdevelopment of other countries and regions from the very beginning. If the underdeveloped world accepts the oppressors' model, which countries and regions will serve as their victims?

The Chinese people were not fully aware, at the beginning, of these endogenous contradictions in the Western model originating from Europe (the US and Japan joined the ranks later). The Chinese people, who had suffered untold humiliations and hardships, went through a long process of tutelage to the West but finally discovered this was a dead end. Chairman Mao Zedong summed up their experience sixty years ago, "From the time of China's defeat in the Opium War of 1840, Chinese progressives went through untold hardships in their quest for truth from the Western countries.... Chinese who then sought progress would read any book containing the new knowledge from the West. The number of students sent to Japan, Britain, the United States, France and Germany was amazing.... For quite a long time, those who had acquired the new learning felt confident that it would save China, ... Only modernization could save China, only learning from foreign countries could modernize China... Imperialist aggression shattered the fond dreams of the Chinese about learning from the West. It was very odd – why were the teachers always committing aggression against their pupil?"<sup>14</sup>

The Chinese of the time worked hard to make their country powerful and at the same time rose in resistance against foreign aggression. In the course of a century and more of modern Chinese history, China tried out almost all Western experiences and isms, holding repeated debates over China's "national system" and transforming it time and again. At last the Chinese people had a clear understanding of "why the teachers were always committing aggression against their pupil." The answer was found in Marx's works: the Western bourgeoisie tried everywhere to transform the world according to its world outlook; it "compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst." "Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeoisie, the East on the West."<sup>15</sup> Therefore, in the world system of developed countries, China had no independent status; in the blueprint of Western "teachers," China, the pupil, would not be allowed to develop and could only be a mere handmaid of the West. Under the cruel oppression of the "teacher," the Chinese people finally saw the true face of Western bourgeois civilization, bourgeois democracy and bourgeois republican schemes. In the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, Sun Yat-sen stated that the "so-called democratic system in modern states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common

14 Mao Zedong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," pp. 412-413.

15 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," pp. 36-37.





people.”<sup>16</sup> He pointed out in his Will that on the basis of his forty years’ experience, he was fully aware that in order to win victory “we must arouse the masses of the people and unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals.”

It was against this unique historical background that the Chinese road of development began to take shape. This historical experience gave rise to the principled stand that “All the nationalities of China have resisted foreign oppression....They favor a union on the basis of equality but are against the oppression of one nationality by another.”<sup>17</sup> From the point of view of the Chinese people, foreign aggression, whatever methods it uses, must be immoral so long as it is unequal. The Chinese people chose Marxism largely due to its radical negation of the rationality and legitimacy of capital’s greedy pursuit of profit. They consequently stepped onto the road of socialism and steered China away from the fate of enslavement by the hegemony of capital in the course of its unlimited expansion.

After gaining independence, China learned some valuable lessons in the course of its long search for a road of development that suited its own conditions, including defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity and rejecting foreign interference and thence proceeding to the maintenance of world peace; drawing on all the fine achievements of foreign cultures on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and strengthening international cooperation in order to improve development; and, with regard to internal affairs, making efforts to accelerate economic growth through expanding the market and emancipating the productive forces while adhering to Marxism and the socialist road. In the historical course of development in China, the CPC and the Chinese government have played a unique role because the dual historical task of national independence and rejuvenation has made special demands on the government’s capacity to organize the masses, resist foreign enemies and concentrate resources on accelerating development. The distinctive feature of the Chinese road of development lies, first of all, in its breaking away from the chain of capital development and following a socialist road. It is also expressed in maintaining national liberation and independence and freeing itself from the imperialist world system and switching to an independent developmental path. Different though it is from the so-called successful path of the developed West, this road is shared by numerous developing countries.

## II. Changes in the Pattern of World Forces and the Chinese Road

The two world wars shook the international system of capital to its very foundation. With the direct participation of and under the auspices of the United States, the strongest of the victorious nations, a new international system was born. It included newly emerging developing countries but also ensured the absolute predominance and decision-making role of the developed countries. In summing up the fifty-year development of the World Bank as

16 Mao Zedong, “The Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” p. 328.

17 Mao Zedong, “The Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” p. 307.





an important component of the international system, Sixto Roxas admitted that the “principle of subsidiarity” established when the institution was set up foreshadowed the global development of capital. The core concept of “principle of subsidiarity” is that “matters ought to be handled by the lowest competent authority.” This lowest competent authority could be at the communal, nation-state or a global level.

In the early years after the Second World War, the principle of subsidiarity was mainly at the service of governments, but in the view of the architects of the Bretton Woods system, the real motive force behind world development was enterprises and entrepreneurs, so this international institution has always located the motive force of development in enterprises and entrepreneurs and given them full support and assistance. Thereafter they found this motive force in “new economic man,” i.e., the salaried managers of giant corporations,<sup>18</sup> and provided them with room for development through various projects and programs. With the constant expansion of multinational companies and non-governmental organizations, the World Bank and other international institutions naturally have shifted the objects of their aid downward from state to society and business and have treated these social and economic interest groups as global actors, making them challengers to sovereign states or making states spokesmen of these interest groups. In short, what the postwar international system has helped bring about is a multi-layered multiplex global order with multiple actors guided by market rules and consisting of sovereign states, multinational corporations, regional and international bodies and non-governmental organizations. Each level has its own rules and mode of operational modes, but market rules are infiltrating all of them. At the outset, this global order was held back by the Cold War situation, but supported by the “structural adjustment fund,” encouraged by “neo-liberalism” and attracted by huge profits, it gradually gathered force. Finally, following the fall of Berlin Wall, the “historical substitution” of economic and social transition was rapidly accomplished in many countries and the global construction of capital markets began, enabling multinational enterprises to develop beyond their national boundaries without availing themselves of artillery or national flags.

A prolonged war has been launched between global capital and national governments. In the US, capital has taken government prisoner and government has become the servant of capital. In Europe, various governments signed the Maastricht Treaty and firmly demanded controls over the circulation of capital. However, their efforts were condemned by the bankers and market economists as an outdated heresy.<sup>19</sup> After capital made its planned escape, European national governments were confronted with a series of reform alternatives that left them no other choice. For this reason, in the parliamentary elections of 2009 the Europeans supported reforms that may continue to injure their economic welfare.

The rapid accumulation of capital throughout the world demands the unlimited expansion

18 Sixto K. Roxas, “Principles for Institutional Reform,” pp. 7-8.

19 Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, *Global Trap: Globalization and the Assault on Prosperity and Democracy*, pp. 76-77.







of its power, and this steadily growing power is conversely used to protect its continuous accumulation of wealth. As a result, its hegemonic power expands continuously along with the accumulation of capital.<sup>20</sup> This expansion does not require territorial occupation but is expressed as dominance in other fields, such as market control, manipulation of public opinion, and even threats to or mockery of state power. Just as Marx observed a long time ago, the increase and decrease of capital and changes in interests are the driving force behind globalization. This promotes changes in the relations among different interests and constantly brings about changes in society, economy, politics and even the international political regime.

Thus we see all forms of newly emerging forces active on the international stage: national, supranational, sub-national, multinational, non-governmental, forces of giant corporations and even a large quantity of capital that does not belong to any corporation. They cooperate as well as compete. Sovereign states have had their day, but the globalization of capital has not been completely able to blot out the national traits of various countries, especially those that grew to maturity with the aid of capital. As a result, in the international system comprised primarily of sovereign states, capital began its unprecedented development by capturing, escaping from or uniting with government.

If we make a cross-spectrum comparison of different forces along national lines, we see national configurations with totally distinct structures. In the United States, capital has carried all before it. In order to lower costs and raise productivity, corporations continuously reorganize production, move their production chain offshore, reduce their operating scale, and separate and re-separate production from management, ending up undertaking capital speculation that risks breaking the law. The logic of unlimited capital multiplication has not only conquered economists and government advisors but also mainstream media contributors and the public. Francis Fukuyama laid bare the truth with one penetrating remark: “Foreign policy reflects the values of their underlying societies.”<sup>21</sup> The American government is just using its economic, social, financial and diplomatic policies and the “Washington consensus” to create conditions and open up new routes for the unlimited worldwide expansion of American capital.

At the other end of the world, in South America and Africa, countries that followed the American model and transformed their systems have not seen rapid economic growth. Global markets facilitate the entry of capital from the developed to the developing world but does not bring prosperity for the latter. Since the 1990s, many developing countries have spent nearly twenty years trialling “reform programs” designed by Western governments and aid organizations and featuring democratic elections and structural adjustments.<sup>22</sup> These programs involved not only designing economic policies for developing countries in the capitals of

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20 H. Arendt, *Imperialism*; David Harvey, *The New Imperialism*.

21 Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*.

22 Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad*, pp. 87, 92, 125-128.





developed countries on the basis of Western historical experience; they also involved adopting a uniform “political template” organizing procedures for developing “good governance,” human rights and multi-party democracy. They tried to conduct “free and fair elections,” “establish the tripartite separation of powers” and “promote civil society (especially including non-governmental organizations and the media)” in developing countries; furthermore, the developed world designed election programs for them and set up administrative mechanisms for elections, supervised the elections, and mediated disputes over their results.<sup>23</sup> That is, the whole process was not only designed by the developed West, but carried out under its guidance and supervision. Countries that adopted this program have had their hands full with elections, with no time and energy for economic development, with the result that they have failed to achieve marked progress in either economic or social development. Some countries, Ethiopia for example, tried the Western-designed model but learned a hard lesson from the resultant political turmoil and economic stagnation. Deciding to adopt a new approach, they began to draw on Asian experience, especially the Chinese experience, and blaze a trail of their own.

People from different countries and civilizations and representing different interests are bound to have different interpretations of the Chinese road or model. The author of “The Beijing consensus,” sees China’s new development approach as defined by a firm willingness to innovate and experiment, by a combination of long-term objective and pragmatic tactics, by maintaining national independence and economic growth, by using development of the economy to improve management of society, and by accumulation of tools of asymmetric power projection (for example, huge foreign exchange reserves). These experiences may become a sort of consensus. Professor Yu Keping sees the Chinese road as a series of strategies and tactics by which China can realize rapid economic growth and socialist modernization against a backdrop of globalization through appropriate decentralization of power and government intervention, that is, socialism with Chinese characteristics. For many people, the Chinese road means incremental and pragmatic market-oriented reform led by the CPC with strong government leadership accompanied by internal reform and opening to the outside world.

Socialism with Chinese characteristics is different both from the pre-reform socialist model characterized mainly by the planned economy and from the social development model of the developed West. On the one hand, China has streamlined administration, decentralized power and accelerated market-oriented development; on the other, it has improved government administration and made adjustments in economic and social life. On the one hand, China has introduced capital and technology; on the other, it has stressed effective utilization and indigenous innovation in this foreign capital and technology. On the one hand, it has grasped production to promote economic growth; on the one other, it has attached importance to the people’s livelihood, environmental protection and balanced development. In short, China

23 Tony Killick, *Aid and the Economy of Policy Change*, p. 4.





has combined the market and socialism into an organic whole, practicing a mixed ownership system with the public economy as the mainstay instead of implementing wholesale privatization. It has adopted a market economy, but seeks to realize social justice through governmental intervention in economic and social life. China will never adopt a multi-party system and parliamentary politics but follows a road of socialist democratic centralism. These basic systemic features and this art of coordination and balance are rooted in China's unique social and historical experience and rich heritage of political wisdom, features that will, in turn, determine China's future economic growth. Holding high the banner of Marxism, China has secured stable and rapid economic growth. It has helped 75 per cent of the world's poor say goodbye to poverty and brought one sixth of the world population on to the road of modernization. These experiences are unique; they are the creations of the Chinese people on the basis of their national conditions.

### III. The Chinese Road and International Rules

By independently learning from and absorbing Western experience without adopting the Western model of development, China has blazed a development road suited to its own conditions, thus enriching the social practice of mankind and challenging the myth that the Western experience is the only correct way. China's national structure, which combines the market and socialism into an organic whole, will, through constant self-improvement, affect the world power setup dominated by the market.

The financial crisis originating in the American subprime lending crisis has affected the whole world. Most governments have taken emergency rescue measures and all have promised to strengthen international cooperation and coordination to avert the collapse of market rules. But the Western-dominated international system has not been shaken. Global actors with different natures, on different scales and with different ways of behaving coexist, and international rules present a complex multi-level, multivariate, multi-layered and asymmetrical picture.

Under the impact of the financial crisis, the US has softened its image of world hegemon and changed its naked unilateral interference (plotting regime change in other countries and waging preemptive "preventive" wars) into more positive bilateral diplomacy: promoting friendly relations with East Asian countries, including China, once again promoting the cross-Atlantic partnership and setting off a fresh craze for things American in Russia. However, while developing relations with each of the major world powers respectively, the US has tried to grasp the other end of each bilateral relationship firmly in its own hands in an attempt to build a multi-layer system stretching out in all directions, with the US at its center, and thus maintain the dominant position of capital in this system.

The EU has been trying for years to establish a multi-layered, multilateral network of world governance with multiple channels that would restrict capital speculation and unbridled





development. It wishes to bring the US into this system and to make it an ardent supporter of multilateralism and a faithful observer of multilateral rules because all EU members are small or medium-sized states in terms of scale, and without appropriate rules it would be hard for EU ideas to gain traction. The only way out of the EU's passive condition is to persuade the US to identify itself with EU rules and stand together with the EU in confronting competition from the newly rising developing world. Regardless of what strategy brings this about, this situation will bring the EU and the US closer and implies at the same time a reorganization of Western forces and the readjustment of international rules. Since the American and EU models are not quite the same, the road to integration is bound to be full of twists and turns.

The success of the Chinese road so far is attributable to two points: first, China has rejected any outside interference; and second, it has taken the initiative in learning from the advanced experience of all other countries in the world. China has consistently put forward its own programs of economic and political institutional reforms and decided its own systems in the light of its national conditions,<sup>24</sup> resulting in the appearance on the world scene of a successful non-Western experience of development. At a time when Western rules hold sway, China's adhering to its own road and doing so successfully is a victory of worldwide significance; more than this, it can even be counted as a contribution to human civilization in that it incorporates the experience of Western developed countries in the framework of socialist development. This is possible because Chinese leaders have repeatedly stressed, "... if we want socialism to achieve superiority over capitalism, we should not hesitate to draw on the achievements of all cultures and to learn from other countries, including the developed capitalist countries, all advanced methods of operation and techniques of management that reflect the laws governing modern socialized production."<sup>25</sup> Meanwhile, China's leaders have repeatedly warned that we must be vigilant against big powers that try to interfere in other countries' internal affairs under the pretence of "democracy," "freedom" and "human rights"<sup>26</sup> and that we can by no means "copy the model of Western political systems. Serious social and political consequences have arisen in some developing countries of the world by blindly copying the model of Western political systems. We must draw lessons from their experience."<sup>27</sup>

In accordance with its own actual needs, China analyzes international experience and then decides what to choose for its own use and what its own system should be, and thus helps establish equality among different civilizations. Mao Zedong pointed out many years ago, "We have put forward the slogan of learning from other countries. I think we have been right.... It must be admitted that every nation has its strong points. If not, how can it survive? How

24 Deng Xiaoping, "On Reform of the Political Structure," pp.179-180.

25 Deng Xiaoping, "On Reform of the Political Structure," p. 361.

26 Jiang Zemin, "Let's Jointly Create a Better World," p. 479.

27 Editorial Department of *Xinhua Monthly*, *Selected Party and State Important Documents since the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC*, vol. 1.1, p. 476.





can it progress? On the other hand, every nation has its weak points.”<sup>28</sup> So, with respect to other countries’ experiences, we should accept the part that is useful and reject that which is not. Thus some experience should be adopted, some not, and learning should be two-way. This repudiates in principle the existence of models that should be copied throughout the world. In practice, as we can see, some international experience such as industrialization and modernization seems to be of universal significance, but the absorption and assimilation of these introduced experiences is always individual and specific. Some experience is applicable in China, but some is only applicable to India or other countries. The practice of forcibly imposing one’s own model on others should be rejected by international rules, while an attitude of respecting other civilizations should be widely promoted.

The success of the Chinese road further proves the diversity of world civilizations. President Jiang Zemin said at the General Assembly of the United Nations, “The world is rich and colorful. Just as the universe cannot possibly have only one color, the world cannot possibly have only one civilization, one social system, one model of development or one sort of values. All countries and nations have contributed to the development of human civilization. The diversity of nations, religions and civilization should be fully respected. The vitality of world development lies just in the existence of this diversity.”<sup>29</sup> Some African countries are glad to see the success of the Chinese road as it proves that development is not the exclusive privilege of developed countries and that development can be expected as long as one’s road is correct.

The recognition of equality and diversity is the basis of a harmonious world. In the world of today, due to differences in the balance of power, the unchecked export of civilizations and lack of appropriate international rules, the world situation is characterized by constant turbulence and unrest and the goal of world peace and development remains remote. The imbalance between world markets and national societies has led to widespread transfers of power, including from government to non-government organizations and from government to corporations and society. All aspects of national governance models face reconstruction, but this reconstruction cannot succeed if it relies entirely on outside forces. The US has perpetually interfered in the internal affairs of Latin American states through coercive and extreme measures, but none has developed into a US-style modern state. Neoconservatism’s much-vaunted “concepts like preemption, regime change, unilateralism, and benevolent hegemony” can only touch off a “virulently negative global reaction.”<sup>30</sup> In this international environment, the Chinese road marks a combination of independence, pragmatism and cooperation, a very valuable experience of peace and development.

The key to the success of the Chinese road of development also lies in linking reform to opening up to the outside world. The opening up policy has brought the entire society into

28 Mao Zedong, “On the Ten Major Relationships,” p. 303.

29 Jiang Zemin, “Speech at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations,” p. 110.

30 Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*.





contact with the outside world, and Chinese society has rediscovered and improved itself in the course of communication, cooperation and comparison with different outside forces.

More importantly, the world significance of the Chinese road consists in the fact that it proves through practice that the objective of liberating and developing the productive forces can be realized through upholding Marxist beliefs and making good use of the market. In comparison with the path traversed by the West, the Chinese road of development is steadier and involves less anguish and more harmony. The Chinese road suits development in China while still needing further improvement. On the road ahead there will be many problems to be solved and many lessons to be learnt and consulted. But as long as we adhere to the correct direction and road, we will surely triumph.

Besides, since China has been successful by rejecting outside intervention and at the same time learning from foreign experience on its own initiative, it has not exported and will not export its model of development, nor will it ever impose its values on others. It believes that all the peoples of the world, being equally enlightened, are able to find a road of development suited to their own conditions.

#### **IV. Conclusions**

A retrospect of the past sixty years of development and a survey of our fast changing world shows that amid turbulent times, China has blazed a road of development worthy of Chinese history and society. In the light of its sixty-year experience of development and the past one hundred years and more of the Chinese people's efforts to explore national rejuvenation, China's development proves that only a model of development suited to national conditions is likely to be successful. Internationally speaking, the success of this model gives eloquent proof of the falsehood of theories about a single development model and the exportability of this model. Whatever misunderstanding and opposition this conclusion may incur, "the maxim of the great Florentine is mine: '*Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti* (Follow your own road and let people say whatever they wish).'"<sup>31</sup>

#### **Notes on contributor**

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31 Karl Marx, *Capital*, p. 11.





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