

The Historical Characteristics of the Democracy Expanding of the European Union

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Abstract: In comparison with the bulk of studies on United States promoting global democracy, the literature on the role of European countries in this field, especially the European Union in this process is limited in China. However, the origin of the so-called “the third wave of democracy” took place in Europe. In this article the author will firstly brief the democracy expansion history of EU after World War II. By comparing with the United States, the author will analyze the characteristics of promoting democracy of EU, as well as conclude that there are two models of pushing world-wide democratization—“American way of outputting democracy” and “European way of expanding democracy”, along with the case study of Ukraine “Orange Revolution” in 2004.

Key Words: democratization European Union Orange Revolution

The US and the Western Europe are the most important two segments of the so called “West” and they are all proud of their identity as mature liberal democracies. These countries gradually ignited the engines of intervening human rights issues and democratization process of other countries after the consolidation of their domestic representative democracies. According to Samuel Huntington, the West changed their foreign policy to promote democratization abroad in the end of 1960s, and one important indicator was the European Community^① revised its attitude to the non liberal democratic candidate member states, including Greece, Portugal and Spain. The policies and acts of improving democratization of EC and its member states were implemented even earlier than US, the latter brought forward its foreign policies dedicating to promote human rights and democracy abroad in the early of 1970s^②. On the one side, Europe and the US have the common

^① Before 1992, the European Union(EU) had been named the European Community (EC).

^② Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

purposes of selling a cosmopolitan liberal democracy. On the other side, the Europe has its own characteristics different with United States when promoting democracy. This article will review briefly the history of EU promoting democracy since the Second World War and make an evaluation and analysis on its democracy overspreading mechanism. After comparing with US corresponding policy, I will sum up the strategic and tactic characteristics of EU in this field, and elaborated that with the case study of “Orange Revolution” occurred in Ukraine in December 2004.

I. Policy Changing of EU on Democratization Abroad

The road of EU enhancing democracy abroad could be divided into two phases: the Cold War phase from 1960s to 1989 and the Post Cold War phase since 1989, the fall of Berlin Wall till now^①. In the second half of Cold War, European Community and its member states had shown the intention of influencing the democracy of other European regions through the enlargement of EC as though the intention had not become the formal guiding policy principle. Since the end of Cold War, the human rights and democracy articles have been written into EU official documents and listed in each important treaty. They have become one part of key values and core considerations of EU foreign policy.

1.1 Phase I: from 1960s to 1989

After World War II, the West European countries were busy with the post war reconstruction and economic development, and the business of promoting democracy abroad had not been on their agenda. Only after a preliminary success of European integration and achieving the first enlargement, the European Community had started to overspread democracy in its neighborhood. In 1957, six European leaders signed the Treaty of Rome and the European Economic Community (EEC) was established. In the following 20 years, with the booming of regional trade, the economy of the European Community (EC)^② grew rapidly. Attracted by the economic benefit, some

^① Micheal Emerson (ed.), *Democratization in the European Neighborhood*, Centre for European Policy Studies, pp. 170, Brussels, 2005.

^② European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), European Atomic Energy Community

other West European countries also expressed the will of joining the EEC. Britain attempted twice in 1963 and 1967, while both were vetoed by French President Charles De Gaulle. In 1970, De Gaulle's successor George Pompidou finally admitted UK could come into EC^①. The first enlargement of EEC happened in 1973 and three mature democratic countries, viz. Denmark, Ireland and Britain got the membership.

The reversal of EEC's attitude spurred the South European countries to work on this way. EEC's enlargement towards South is almost simultaneous with the democratization of southern European countries. In 1974, with the end of military dictatorship, the new government of Greece quickly contacted EC and asked to join EC in June 1975. Prime Minister Karamanlis hoped to improve the economic development and increase the export to the West Europe market, especially for Greece agricultural products. Greece also planned to reduce the dependence on America and balance the influence of Turkey and Slavonian countries. In addition, the neutral and conservative groups admitted that joining EC was the best guarantee for the squab Greece democratic institutions^②. Different with Greece, the Spain and Portugal more cherished the EC membership as a symbol of their European identity. King Juan Carlos of Spain stressed that the destiny of Spain was in Europe and Spain had been entangled with Europe. General Antonio de Spínola of Portugal said that the future of Portugal was definitely linked with Europe. The middle class of these two countries had strong resonance with Europe that constituted the social base of the democratization movement. Economic factor is also very important. A half of import and export of Portugal was trade-off with European Community. Spain was deeply interdependent with EC in tourism, trade and investment. Portugal applied to join EC in March 1977, and Spain put forward a similar proposal three months later. Like Greece, the establishment of democratic institutions in these two South European countries was the necessary condition of being involved in the European

(Euratom) and European Economic Community (EEC) merged to form the European Community (EC) in 1967.

^① Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Chap. 3, 4, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.

^② Susannah Verney, "Greece and European Community", Kevin Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas (ed.), *Political Change in Greece: Before and After the Colonels*, pp. 259, London: Croom Helm, 1987.

Community. Meanwhile, the EC membership was also conceived of the insurance of democracy from the other viewpoint. In 1981 Greece got the EC membership and in 1986 Spain and Portugal came into EC as well.

To join EC for the three South European countries means to be one part of Europe and “the democracy camp”, which also means that EC would afford the potential market, security assurance and financial aid. On July 1985, for helping the new South European member states, European Council of EC decided to launch a series of comprehensive Mediterranean programs pooling multi-sources funds to support the regional economy of Mediterranean coastwise member states. These projects are the embryo of today’s EU Structural Fund which is specifically designed for balancing the regional economic development and improving the economic growth of poorer members. In 1993, the Cohesion Fund was established for Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain (their per capita GDP was lower than 90% of EC average at that time). These aids have been very helpful for the economic growth and the stability of their democracy institutes.

In the democratization process of Portugal, the government of Federal Republic of Germany and German Social Democracy Party were very active and helped the government of Portugal and Portugal Social Party a lot materially. And according to Samuel Huntington, German model and their instruments afforded the US government inspiration. Consequently US afforded similar financial assistances. Huntington thought that the democratization movement in Portugal was the departure of the third wave of democratization and the invention led by German was crucial for Portugal democratization^①. The democracy transition of the South European countries even influenced the Socialism regimes of East Europe. American scholar Adam Przeworski said that the new elites and the people of East Europe desired towards Europe. “Democracy, market and Europe” were their marching flags and directions. Spain was the best example. Since 1976, only in 15 years, Spain has successfully consolidated its democracy institute, peacefully handed over the power, finished the economic modernization, and

^① Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

improved its international competence, the army was controlled by the elected government, solved the complicated ethnic problems, overspread the citizenship, rebuilt its culture and made itself a portion of European Community. All of these were the dreams of East European people.^①

1.2 Phase II: From 1989 till now

In the second phase, EC's function on promoting democratization abroad is no more limited in financial aid. Actually the principal idea change happened in the making of Single European Act (SEA) around in 1986. In the preface of SEA published in 1987, European leaders all agreed that "aware of the responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking ever increasingly with one voice and to act with consistency and solidarity in order to more effectively protect its common interests and independence, in particular to display the principles of democracy and compliance with the law and with human rights to which they are attached, so that together they may make their own contribution to the preservation of international peace and security in accordance with the undertaking entered into by them within the framework of the United Nations Charter"^②. While it was also worth noticing that the human rights and democracy issues were not written into the text of SEA. In the Treaty of European Union (TEU) ratified in November 1993, these principles were written in the first part of the text and TEU declared that one of the purposes of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy was to develop and consolidate the democracy and rule of law, respecting human rights and fundamental freedom. Meanwhile it asks the Community dedicating to developing and consolidating democracy institutes in the area of development and cooperation. EU emphasized the importance of these principles in Article F, Title I of TEU:

(1) The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy.

^① Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

^② Single European Act (1986), *Official Journal L 169 of 29 June 1987*, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm>.

(2) The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.

(3) The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies.^①

In May 1995, European Commission especially proclaimed that it would mark the principles of respecting democracy and human rights in agreements between the Community and the third countries^②. Treaty of Nice signed in December 2001 emphasized that EU attached importance to democracy, rule of law, respecting human rights and fundamental freedom when it develops economic, financial and technology cooperation with the countries out of Union. In sum, human rights and democracy have become important political aims in the EU external relationship.

The Central and Eastern Europe occupied the priority position in EU external relationship. With the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989, the Central and East European countries also turned to the West and desired for joining European Union. From 1990 to 1995, EU signed the cooperation accords with eight Central and Eastern European countries. EU brought forward some conditions for these associated countries who were seeking membership of the EU. The Copenhagen Council set out three standards specifically for the Central and East European countries in June 1993 which was named “Copenhagen Criteria”. It addressed a new Member State must meet three criteria for joining the EU, the first one was the political one, viz. with stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights as well as respect for and protection of minorities. If the candidates could not reach the standards, they couldn't get the opportunity of opening entry negotiations. And the

^① Treaty on European Union (1992), *Official Journal C 191 of 29 July 1992*, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm>; http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/intro/index.htm#treaties.

^② Communication from the Commission ‘on the inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries’, COM(95) 216 final, Brussels, 23 May 1995.

Commission has been delegated to evaluate the democracy situation and observe whether the candidate works in this direction.

EU had provided a series of financial aids before accepting these Central and East European countries. After 1989, EU set out the “PHARE Plan” which was a multilateral assisting framework firstly consisted of Poland and Hungary, then overspread to most of Central and East European countries. The average sum could reach 330 million Euros for each applicant. EU also established the European Rebuilding and Development Bank which specifically offers loans for supporting the private capital and the privatization process in Central and East Europe. All of the financial assistance was affiliated with political conditions including democratization.

Since the end of the Cold War, the human rights and democracy principles have been listed in EU’s developing and aid policies with the developing countries in the world rather than limited in its neighbor areas. The word “democracy” was also often mentioned in the declarations of EU in many international forums or organizations. These phenomena rarely appeared in the Cold War era. For example, the articles of democracy and human rights were absent in the first two Lome Agreements between EC and the ACP Group (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States) in 1970s. Actually the first article on human rights was drawn up by the ACP countries in the third Lome Agreement (1985-1990), when ACP countries were strongly against the inclusion of South Africa with apartheid so that the cooperation with South Africa had to be put in the attachment rather than in the text^①. While in the fourth Lome agreement signed in November 1995, the aid from EU was linked with democracy and human rights, and the democratic intervention was also been mentioned. In the fifth Lome agreement, the ACP countries had to commit the democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance to be the fundamental principles under the pressure of EU. According to this agreement, if ACP countries disobeyed the principles, EU has the right of stopping the assistance.

^① Carl B. Greenidge, “Return to Colonialism? The New Orientation of European Development Assistance”, Marjorie Lister (ed.), *New Perspectives on European Union Development Cooperation*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1999.

II. The Characteristics of EU Overspreading Democracy

As the sum above, promoting democracy was not original mission of EU in its initial stages. With the spillover of European integration from economy to politics and the consolidation of the position of EU as the representative of Europe, EU exposed its desire to overspread democracy abroad. Ms. Benita Ferrero Waldner, the Commissioner of External Relations said in one speech in Brussels:

“Let me conclude with Jeremy Rifkin. The ‘European Dream’, he writes, ‘is a beacon of light in a troubled world. It beckons us to a new age of inclusivity, diversity, quality of life, deep play, sustainability, universal human rights, the rights of nature, and peace on Earth.....I will do my best to contribute through my work in the Commission to making this dream come true.’”^①

The EU and the US are the two most important actors in improving democratization in the world, but each of them is different on working styles. Next I will introduce the characteristics of EU with the comparison of US.

(1) The US has a global democracy strategy while EU majorly focuses on its neighborhood area. In terms of the power gap, EU and the US set different democratization goals. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the solo superpower, viz. US has an ambitious goal to overspread liberal democracy into every corner of the world. EU also believes democracy could create a better world, but on the other side it is more realistic. Its plan of promoting democracy is closely linked with its security and economic benefits. Besides the Central and East European countries, the former Yugoslavia countries are trying to apply EU membership as well. Croatia has been one candidate country, and Bosnia, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania all prepare to receive the democracy appraisal from European Commission periodically. At the same time Ukraine and Turkey located at east edge of EU also revised their domestic laws for reaching the requirement of political democratization by

^① http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/ferrero-waldner/speeches/speeches/ephearing_051004_en.htm.

EU.

EU has become the synonym of Europe and is extremely magnetic for its peripheral countries. But EU also has its realistic consideration. For example, in the case of Ukraine, Mr. Yushchenko was elected the President under the support of the West in the so called “Orange Revolution” in December 2004. While we must know at the same time that the former President Leonid Kuchma had asked for joining EU and adjusted the domestic policies accordingly. But EU rejected Kuchma’s kindness twice. On the summit of EU-Ukraine hold in Yalta 2003, the President of European Commission Romano Prodi definitely declared that the probability of Ukraine becoming a EU member approximated to the New Zealand. President Prodi also said the “Neighbourhood Policy” of EU was designed for some countries geographically unfit for joining EU, like Ukraine, Tunisia, Morocco and so on^①. The reason why Kuchma turned to Russia was partly for he could not see the prospect of being an EU country.^② For the same reason, EU didn’t accept the same application from Yushchenko although Ukraine had experienced the “Revolution”.

(2) The US often pushes democratization radically and it doesn’t hesitate at using forces, but EU is far more cautious. The “output democracy” of the United States leaves the world an image of arrogant hegemony. The image of EU looks more peaceful and EU works hard to help “regime changes” with nonviolent means. In most time EU insists on the principle of respecting the authority of UN and solving the crisis in a political way. At the same time, EU also possesses the capability and abundant experience on the reconstruction and peace-building so that it is regarded as a “civilian power” comparing with US as a “military power”. In some cases of expanding democracy, the US didn’t get support from EU and other big European countries, especially in the case of Iraq War when US did its best to achieve the “low intensity democracy” at the cost of a “low intensity war”. EU encourages democratic development rooted from the interior. The “Color Revolutions” happened in

^① Paul Kubicek, “The European Union and democratization in Ukraine”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 38 (2005), p.280.

^② J. Maksymiuk, 23 September 2003, “Leonid Kuchma signs accord on CIS single economic zone with ‘reservations’”, RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report 5 (35).

Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan got high appraisals from EU and its member states. Some Europeans even taught George W. Bush with these cases that democracy couldn't be implanted with military actions and only could grow up with the domestic endorsement^①.

(3) The US insists that the "low intensity democracy" is enough for the countries to be democratized. The "low intensity democracy" means reaching the bottom line of democracy with some formal democracy institutes such as the periodical elections and multiple parties competition. However it is faulty for the reason lacking of other conditions like human rights, economic development and social justice etc.. EU alleges that the "comprehensive democracy" is necessary including the free market economy based on private ownership, human rights and social justice. All these elements are exhibited on the conditions raised by EU for the Central and East European candidate countries. The Copenhagen Criteria includes two other conditions which were "the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union" except the political one.

In respect that linking with its enlargement, EU promotes democracy in its neighbor area at higher conditions to ensure it could assimilate the new member states. Therefore EU sets a series of benchmarks and asks the new members to obey not only the principles of human rights, rule of law, stable democratic institutions and protecting minority, but also guaranteeing the well working of market economy, capable of coping with the inner competition, and accepting the whole EU legal system and so on. The nuclear part of EU's promoting democracy plan is focused on its own periphery as though EU also supports the global and regional democratic development, including the implementation of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) to encourage the human rights and promote democracy by assisting the NGOs and other international organizations^②.

^① Michel Bastian, <http://www.freeworldweb.net/values8.html>.

^② Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: "The European Union's Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries", Brussels, 8 May 2001, COM (2001) 252 final.

(4) More institutionalized, more systematic, more successive and more bureaucratic when EU promotes democracy abroad than US does. As a union of diverse nation states, EU acts on the base of the harmonization of various opinions that make it more democratic, pluralistic, harmonic, stable, and easier for acceptance. On the other side, EU is also concerned about the situation of the objective countries “after democratization”. Some countries, such as Poland, Czech Republic, Lithuanian, Romania are involved in the EU. For some countries nearby EU who were temporarily impossible getting membership, EU also afforded the assistance through the TACIS Program (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States) for the former Soviet Union countries and the CARDS Program (The Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) for the west Balkan countries. From 1991 to 2005, CARDS Program had cost 4.6 billion euros that occupied the most of the total sum 6.8 billion euros of EU assistance to West Balkan region^①. All the countries who want to get these aids have to accept the affiliated political conditions.

The United States attaches importance to the NGOs in the process of democratization. In 2006 some American diplomats blamed Brussels "bureaucracy" and "lack of bravery" for democracy. The US diplomat Scott Carpenter said to the External Relations Commissioner of EU, Ms. Benita Ferrero-Waldner at a Brussels seminar that “we think it is high time Europe had the same kind of facility (as the National Endowment for Democracy of US)” and “if you want the best bang for your buck, the only way to promote civil society in the world is through NGOs”. NED chief Carl Gershman channeled \$140 million a year of US cash directly to NGOs. Ms Ferrero-Waldner answered the US diplomats as praising the existing EU tools for pro-democracy work abroad. She said that EU election observation missions, the financial incentives of the newly-enhanced European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), EU global development aid and the enlargement process “have, I think, made a real difference”, she also pointed out that the EU spends 2 billion a year on "democracy-related" work to the US' \$1.4 billion and that “human security is central to my thinking.”^②

^① Council Regulation (EC) 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000.

^② Andrew Rettman, “US pushing EU into more edgy pro-democracy work”, *EU Observer*, 07, Dec., 2006.

In the following segment, I will elaborate the effectiveness of European Union's promoting democracy and its characteristics in the case of "Orange Revolution" of the Ukraine in detail.

III. Case Study: EU in the "Orange Revolution"

Ukraine is located in the east of Europe and it becomes the new neighbor after the fifth enlargement of EU in May 2004. In the "Orange Revolution" happened in 2004, EU played an important role even superior to the United States.

Firstly we should admit that Ukraine was on the edge of the potential economic and political crisis before "Orange Revolution". After Ukraine was independent from the Soviet Union in 1991, the people were unsatisfied with the stagnant economy and oligarchy political regime, as well as the prevailing corruption. But on the other side, EU played a catalyst role for this "revolution" on some key aspects.

(1) The former Soviet Union countries located in Europe were deeply influenced by the magnetic effect of EU as the most successful paradigm of regional integration in the world. "Return Europe" and "join EU" were the slogans of Ukraine leaders for catching public support. On February 1996, President Leonid Kuchma declared that the origin of Ukraine culture was the European Christian civilization that was why Ukrainian regard the Europe as their homeland. In April, in one convention of the Council of Europe, he proclaimed that Ukraine's strategic aim was to integrate into Europe, and firstly was to become a member of European Union. In 1999, the Ukraine Minister of Foreign Affairs Boris Tarasiuk said the concept of Europe had been the national concept and a stable factor of Ukraine^①. On August 2000, Kuchma specifically set up a national committee to revise the relative laws of Ukraine to be in line with EU law, and the chairman of this committee was Kuchma himself. The Ukrainian people also had a fever of joining EU.

^① R. Solchanyk, *Ukraine and Russia: the post-Soviet transition*, p. 94, Rowman and Littlefield, MD: Lanham, 2000.

According to a survey in 2002, 57% interviewee supported Ukraine joining EU, the opposite percent was only 16%^①.

But EU has never officially had the will to accept Ukraine. EU believes after accommodating with more than 10 new member states in a few years, it was beyond its capability to grant Ukraine the membership in terms of its large territory and severe poorness. Therefore, Ukraine couldn't become the associated country which is the preliminary necessary step of joining EU. And EU had majorly concerned about some sublevel issues, such as the non-proliferation, the NATO enlargement, keeping the relationship with Russia and the close of Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the negotiations with Ukraine. Since 2000, EU began to care about the human rights and democracy of Ukraine. Along with the United States, EU directly figured Kuchma the biggest obstacle of the democratization of Ukraine and believed the EU-Ukraine relationship wouldn't get progress if he had been the President. Meanwhile EU turned to help Yushchenko, the leader of the opposition in the 2004 election. The result was Yushchenko could draw on more votes behind the flag of Europe.

The "concept of Europe" had a strong mobilization effect in the "Orange Revolution". The blue flags of European Union were hang out at the famous Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kiev by the backers of Yushchenko. Yushchenko promised he could lead Ukraine into European Union and declared that "the world is witnessing a noble European nation, one that embraces genuine democratic values and, even more importantly, one that will stand up to defend these values with dignity".^②

(2) EU had been engaged in the basic job for the democratization of Ukraine before the "Orange Revolution". EU and Ukraine signed the "Partnership and Cooperation Agreement" in June 1994, which was the first one agreement between EU and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On the basis of this agreement, EU provided the assistance to Ukraine and the total

^① K. Wolczuk, "Ukraine's policy towards the European Union: a case of 'declarative Europeanization'", Paper for the Stefan Batory Foundation Project, The Enlarged EU and Ukraine: New Relations, 2003, p.6.

^② V. Yushchenko, "Our Ukraine", *Wall Street Journal*, 3 December, 2004.

sum arrived at 1 billion euro from 1991 to 2002.^① Most assistance into Ukraine was from TACIS that consisted of more than 60 projects not only involving the infrastructure cooperation, such as improving the traffic efficiency, border management, but also having many “soft” ones, for instance, regenerating the legal institutes and supporting the NGOs for the development of Ukraine civil society and changing the oligarchy regime.

As though EU didn't take Ukraine's entry into account, it made use of Ukraine's eagerness to promote Ukraine's democracy. In one announcement of Brussels published in 1999, EU said it understood the desire of Ukraine for Europe and welcome its inclining to Europe. At the same time it also stressed that EU strongly supported “the consolidation of democracy and good governance”^②. The worsening of EU-Ukraine relationship in 2000 was also caused by the human rights issues. In 2000 Ukrainian correspondent Georgi Gongadze was murdered which was regarded as a malignant violation of the speech freedom by the west media. An overture of banishing Ukraine was also raised in a conference of the Council of Europe. On three years anniversary of this incident, EU still mentioned it and expressed discontentment for no result of this case.

Besides, European Commission, European Parliament and some member states supported the students and the young in the “Color Revolutions” with the United States, for example, the Pora which was the core organization of student campaign in the “Orange Revolution”, the Otpor in Serbia and the Kmara in Georgia. These organizations of the young all gained lots of funds from Europe and US. The United States was the major sponsor of these organizations, for example, most funds of Pora were afforded by the NED and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)^③, while at the same time EU and some of its member states also provide much support too^④.

^① http://www.delukr.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_country/data.htm.

^② “European Council Common Strategy of 11 December 1999 on Ukraine”, Document 1999/877/CFSP, in *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 23 December 1999.

^③ Paul Kubicek, “The European Union and Democratization in Ukraine”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 38 (2005), p.287.

^④ Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine's Orange Revolution”, *Foreign Affairs*, p.52, March/April 2005.

(3) EU and its member states questioned the legitimacy of Ukrainian election with the Organization of Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE) and helped Yushchenko to overthrow the outcome of the second round election. On the three rounds elections in Ukraine, the international organizations, such as OSCE, sent thousands of election monitors there. On the other side, through the training of OSCE, EU and other international organizations, the NGOs of Ukraine also united into a “Non-party Committee of Ukraine Voters” to monitor the election who deploy more than 10,000 observers. Hardly did the first two rounds voting come to end (two candidates came out after the first round, then Viktor Yanukovich won the second round rather than Yushchenko), the international monitors proclaimed there existing cheat and injustice in the elections and rejected the outcome of the winning of Yanukovich.

Some European leaders participated in the mediation and exerted pressure to Ukraine government. When in stalemate since the second round voting was end, Javier Solana, the EU High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy, Alexander Kwasniewski, President of Poland, Valdas Adamkus, President of Lithuanian, and Lech Walesa, the former President of Poland arrived in Kiev on 26th November for mediation. At last Kuchma had to accede to the requirement of the opposition, Yushchenko’s “Our Ukraine” and agreed to reorganize the central election commissions who was charged with covering the cheating actions and revised the election law to make sure the smooth working of the third voting justly. As evidence of their effort, on 8th December, the US President George W. Bush, delivered messages to Kwasniewski and Adamkus for the appreciation of Poland and Lithuanian in the voting after Yushchenko won the election^①. Moreover, before the voting Lech Walesa and many politicians from Germany, Netherland, Slovak, Czech Republic and so on had speeches in the Maidan Nezalezhnosti for supporting Yushchenko^②.

IV. Evaluation and Conclusion

^① Taras Kuzio, “Poland Plays Strategic Role in Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’”, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3172&article_id=2368993.

^② Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution”, *Foreign Affairs*, p.50, March/April 2005.

The four characters of EU promoting democracy appeared evidently in the proceeding of the “Orange Revolution” which are, firstly emphasizing the peripheral region of itself, secondly with a comprehensive toolbox and to be cautious on using forces, thirdly with a high democracy evaluation standard and requiring a sustainable democracy, and at last with a successive and bureaucratic working style.

Retrospect to the past four decades of EU’s democracy aid, we could find it has become an experienced and crucial actor in the world. As the common political institutions and values do Europe and America have, and they do have the desire to promote their core values, such as market economy and liberal democracy. On the other side, there were differences on how to promote democracy between them. I could conclude that European overspreading democracy and American output democracy are two modes of selling democracy. EU overspreads democracy in cautious ways relying on its soft power including security assurance, economic assistance and cultural attraction and often merges the objective countries peacefully. However the American enterprise of democracy is more aggressive and utilitarian. The US cares the outcome more than the means and doesn’t hesitate to use forces, such as in Chile, Ecuador, Salvador or Iraq. And America also often implants its democracy mode into the objective countries no matter if necessarily or appropriately.

The successful enlargements of European Union repeatedly reveal that EU’s promoting democracy mode is more competitive when comparing with the failure of George W. Bush’s “Democratic Roadmap for the Middle-East”. Robert Kagan, the famous American neoconservative scholar and commentator who noted that “Americans are from Mars, and Europeans are from Venus” also admitted that Europe brought the world “a unique kind of power, not coercive military power but the power of attraction”. Robert Cooper, the former consultant of Tony Blair had a more suitable sum-up that EU affords “the lure of membership”. In the eyes of Cooper, EU is “a liberal, democratic, voluntary empire expanding continuously outward as others seek to join it. This expanding Europe absorbs problems and conflicts rather than

directly confronting them in the American style.” And “the lure of membership...has helped stable the Balkans and influenced the political course of Turkey.”^①

As summed above, the manner of EU overspreading democracy is more peaceful, comprehensive and easier for acceptance than US. But it is still worthy of noticing that the purpose of EU overspreading democracy is to sell the liberal democracy from the West and granted the universality without considering of the cultural, social and religion backgrounds. Besides some democratization tools intervening the sovereignty of the objective countries, at least two other following points the author could not agree when evaluating EU democracy promoting: 1, civil and political rights were over focused superior to economic and social rights, as well the election and political liberty were over emphasized; 2, the collective rights were often absent in EU’s agenda contrast with the individual rights.

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^① Robert Kagan, “Embraceable EU”, *Washington Post*, December 5, 2004.

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