Ukraine not within the target of China's CEE strategy （Liu Zuokui）

In recent years, China has moved into diplomatic overdrive in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). Bilateral relations between China and CEECs have been greatly boosted, with China-CEE summits held in 2012 and 2013 respectively. It is worth noting that the participating countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the three "New Eastern Europe countries" (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) are not part of Beijing's CEE strategy, which was in fact misinterpreted during the Ukraine crisis. For example, one foreign critic wrongly argued that Ukraine poses a setback in China's CEE strategy.

Is Ukraine a key board in Beijing's CEE strategy?

The Financial Times published on March 3, 2014, an article entitled "Ukraine a setback in China's Eastern Europe strategy" stated, "Just three months ago (November 2013), China was in diplomatic overdrive to establish a grand plan for economic and political cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) at a summit with 16 regional leaders in Bucharest, Romania. Since then, more than $19 billion in Chinese investment and loan pledges have flowed to the region, outstripping in scale any previous phase of bilateral economic engagement, according to research by Grison's Peak, a London-based merchant bank. The $19bn plus in pledges since November accounted for the lion's share of a total of $22.2bn in signed loan and investment deals between China and the region for all of 2013…. The revolution in Ukraine has thrown up a series of delicate questions for Beijing, which had a 'strategic partnership' with the government of ousted president Viktor Yanukovich. Ukraine was a key plank in Beijing's CEE strategy. Of the estimated $19bn in investments and loans announced since November, $8bn was destined for Ukraine."

The comments are drawing a blurred line between China-Ukraine diplomacy and China's CEE strategy, which has caused a misunderstanding of China's foreign policies in the international community and has undermined the positive momentum in China's CEE strategy.

Reasons Ukraine is not key in China's CEE strategy

Because Ukraine is not on Beijing's list of the 16 CEE countries, including the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Croatia, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, the Republic of Poland, Romania, the Republic of Serbia, the Slovak Republic, and the Republic of Slovenia.

So why doesn't China factor in Ukraine? Consider the following reasons:

First of all, China sees its CEE strategy as part of a broader cooperation with the European Union (EU). It is obvious that the 16 CEE countries are either EU members or candidate EU members. Ukraine, as a matter of fact, has never been considered a potential EU member. Therefore, the argument that Ukraine is "a key plank" in Beijing's CEE strategy apparently goes against China's foreign policy.

Additionally, despite Ukraine's geographical proximity to the CEE countries, it will still not be included on the list as China has to consider the concerns of the CEE countries. Ukraine is one of the target countries within the Eastern Partnership (EP), a multilateral framework co-initiated by some CEE countries (for example, Poland and Lithuania) and EU members (for example Sweden) in an effort to boost cooperation between the EU and its eastern neighbors. The EP constitutes an important part of the foreign policy of the EU and the CEE countries. China, instead of interfering in this process, chooses to understand and support their efforts, which will in return deepen the strategic common ground between China and the CEE countries.

On a third note, Ukraine maintains a close political and strategic relationship with Russia, which actually views Ukraine to be situated within its traditional sphere of influence. China will certainly not run the risk of antagonizing Russia and include Ukraine into its CEE strategy as this would be detrimental to the China-Russia strategic partnership.

Since Ukraine's geopolitical sensitivity makes it vulnerable to the tug-of-war between Russia and the EU, China in particular should tread a fine line between the two sides. China has no intention of intervening in the Eurasian Union or the free trade zone negotiations between Ukraine and the EU.

China's Ukraine policy has limited influence on China-CEE cooperation

Although China is not fully insulated from the Ukraine crisis, the repercussions are nothing but indirect.

First off, Ukraine shares borders with four CEE countries, including Poland, Hungary, Slovak and Romania, which all hold a great stake in Ukraine's peace and political stability. The CEE countries, especially the Visegrad Group countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia), are likely to shift their focus to resolving the Ukraine crisis, for example by pushing the EU to accept Ukraine as one of its member countries or increasing its aid to Ukraine. As a consequence, they may rein back on their foreign policy, which will affect their cooperation with China. However, it must be noted that such influence is very limited as the cooperation with China is in line with their economic interests.

Secondly, the China and CEE cooperation will be indirectly affected by China's attitude towards Russia. The Ukraine crisis, in nature, is a game between the EU and Russia. It has been vaulted to the front because of the unique geographical location of the CEE countries. In addition to the support from the EU and the United States, the CEE countries also hope to gain support from other countries. However, the fear that China may show a pro-Russian inclination in the Ukraine crisis could affect China-CEE cooperation.

CEE countries have been trying to integrate with the West by promoting the restructuring and reform of Ukraine. In handling the Ukraine crisis, China must take into account the "CEE factor." If not handled properly, it will not only undermine their perception of China but also shake their confidence to undertake any further cooperation with China. In this regard, China should reduce the impact of the crisis on China-CEE cooperation down to a minimum by carefully handling the relationships with the EU and Russia.

From my recent research on CEE countries, I concluded that both EU and CEE think tanks understand fully China's balanced diplomacy towards EU and Russia. Before China abstained from the UN Security Council Resolution on Ukraine, I was visiting the Visegrad Group countries. Most of the think tanks of these countries predicted that China would abstain from voting because such decision would best suit China's interests. In fact, because of its consistent and predictable nature, as well as China's positive communication and coordination efforts in resolving the Ukraine crisis, China's CEE strategy has thus far won the increased understanding from CEE countries.

The author is an associate professor with and deputy head of the Department of Central and Eastern European Studies, Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2014-03/27/content_31917739.htm

（Contact Liu Zuokui：liuzk@cass.org.cn）